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1 Introduction
This thesis adds further pieces to the large mosaic of human morality. It
contains four essays on the topics of cooperation, honesty, and fairness. The
purpose of this dissertation is to gain a better understanding of how individual
ethicality unfolds in strategic interactions, where two or more persons interact
and their actions determine each others payoﬀs. Using economic laboratory
experiments we analyze how strategic concerns and the decision making en-
vironment inﬂuence ethical behavior. One central objective of this thesis is
to better understand the roots of ethicality in situations with strategic inter-
dependencies in order to make prescriptions about what ﬁrms and organiza-
tions can do to foster good behavior.
The main motivation for this thesis stems from the prevalence of scandals
and fraudulent behavior in the corporate realm. Present research has shown
that persisting unethical behavior is not due to a small number of immoral
persons who commit large unethical action but rather a large fraction of per-
sons who commit small acts of unethical behavior (Bazerman and Tenbrunsel,
2011a). The persistence of such behavior can not only lead to great costs for
corporations, e.g., as a result of legal proceedings, but also increase distrust
in the free market economy, which ultimately might endanger ﬁrms' existence
(Banerjee, 2007). These potential consequences underline why corporations
should have a vital interest in understanding which organizational measures
foster ethicality.
The perseverance of immoral conduct in the business world, however, has
led to the question of how much of this is due to the inherent immorality of
individuals and how much of this is due to the decision-making environment,
i.e, to the structure and incentives resulting from exchange (e.g. Falk and
Szech, 2013; Trevino, 1986). This thesis focuses on the latter part, and asks
how the decision-making environment inﬂuences ethical behavior.
Empirical research on ethicality has typically focused on individual decision
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making without strategic interactions. In a series of path-breaking studies
Milgram (1963), for example, studies how individuals obey authorities in an
individual decision making context. Furthermore, the famous trolley-problem
(Foot, 1967), initially used as a thought experiment by moral philosophers to
study moral values, is now a well-renowned tool in the cognitive and behav-
ioral sciences (Knobe and Nichols, 2008) to study when and why people apply
utilitarian or deontological ethics.
Thus, it does not come as a surprise that empirical researchers in ethics
have focused on individual attitudes and moral judgments, rather than focus-
ing on interactions. One explanation for this development could be that the
traditional discourse in ethics has viewed individual moral behavior as people
reasoning about moral dilemmas and then (potentially) following these moral
principles.
Contrary to the traditional approach, this thesis focuses on individual's eth-
icality in strategic interactions. Moreover, the thesis tries to investigate illumi-
nate individual ethicality when variables of the decision-making environment
change. To understand what drives ethical behavior in ﬁrms and inform de-
signers of organizations this seems to be a promising approach since employees
in ﬁrms frequently interact and these interaction are inﬂuenced by the organi-
zational setup. Important variables of the decision-making environment within
organizations can be incentives, such as how employees are paid, or more sub-
tle factors like employee knowledge about the good or bad behavior of others,
or how certain ﬁrm policies are represented.
Ethical behavior in strategic interactions can have many diﬀerent facets.
This dissertation focuses on three of them. The ﬁrst is cooperative behavior
in teams. In modern ﬁrms, cooperation among employees is crucial to the
overall success. However, in several collaborative situations, it is individually
rational - from a standard economic point of view - for employees to refrain
from exerting eﬀort, i.e., not to cooperate with her fellow employees, although
it would be mutually beneﬁcial for the complete enterprise. Particularly when
employees know and see each other on a day-to-day basis the plain economic
point of view seems simplistic and one might think that cooperation can be
easily sustained. However, in large ﬁrms teams often work together in diﬀerent
time-zones and in diﬀerent places and are not able to monitor and potentially
control each other. This makes it much more diﬃcult to enforce cooperative
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behavior. Consequently, we ask in Chapter 2: How does subjects' knowledge
of others' behavior inﬂuence their willingness to cooperate?
The second aspect is honesty competitive environments. To align individ-
uals' interests with those of the ﬁrm, companies are increasingly make use of
performance-based incentive schemes. One prominent performance-based in-
centives scheme is a tournament incentive scheme. Here, employees are paid
based on their performance relative to others. Employment in nearly every or-
ganization entails participation in tournaments, even if such incentives are not
explicit, e.g., via the payment scheme. An example of an implicit tournament
is the promotion of employees. From a standard economic point of view, this
incentive structure should increase productive eﬀort by employees. However,
since it is always beneﬁcial for employees to be marginally better then their
fellow employees, this incentive might also be responsible for unethical con-
duct such as lying. In Chapter 3 we ask: How does the strength tournament
incentives aﬀect honest reporting of one's own performance?
The third aspect of ethicality is fairness which is covered from two diﬀerent
angles in the last two chapters. The ﬁrst angle pertains to the individual view of
diﬀerent fairness notions and how these fairness notions inﬂuence bargaining.
The second angle considers how individuals react when fairness norms are
violated.
Fairness and equity considerations are a major source of conﬂicts in the
workplace. When principals assign work among several employees, when bonus
payments are distributed or when employers and employees negotiate about the
distribution of future earnings, equity and fairness arguments are often present.
From a normative perspective, however, it is sometimes not clear what fairness
really means (Konow, 1996). In Chapter 4 we ask: How do outside options, i.e.,
an individual's payment in case of a negotiation breakdown, inﬂuence equity
considerations in bargaining?
A further aspect of fairness is covered in the last chapter. It tackles the
question when unfair behavior is punished by unaﬀected bystanders. There are
many situations in organizational life where employees observe the wrongdo-
ing of fellow employees but remain silent. For example, when hospital doctors
take bribes from persons in need or if bureaucrats do not give public orders
to companies although they deserve it by law. Often unaﬀected colleagues
or bystanders observe this wrongdoing but do not act and report or punish
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the wrongdoer. From a standard economic point of view it seems rather clear
that this kind of moralistic punishment will never occur: If bystanders cannot
expect any material gain from punishing the wrongdoer she will never engage
in a retributive act. There is, however, a growing interest by economists in
the question how moral inclinations lead individuals to engage in punishment
although they are not aﬀected (e.g., Lergetporer et al., 2014). In Chapter 5
I argue that two situational variables inﬂuence moralistic punishment. First,
we ask how framing of unfair behavior inﬂuences moralistic punishment dif-
ferently. Second, we ask when the victim of norm violations does not observe
the bystanders action, will she punish?
Although every chapter in this thesis deals with a very diﬀerent aspect of
human morality in strategic interactions all essays have certain aspects in
common. In every chapter we employ the very same research method, i.e.
the economic laboratory experiment. Because researchers have the possibility
to exogenously vary factors of the decision-making environment and observe
corresponding changes in behavior this method is a powerful tool to investigate
moral behavior (Falk and Heckman, 2009). In addition to that, decisions of our
participants in all studies have monetary consequences for them and for other
participants. This is evident for employees' behavior in real ﬁrms making
the applied research method more valid than questionnaire studies that are
usually applied to study the questions of cooperation, honesty and fairness.
Moreover, in every experimental paradigm used in this thesis there exists a
clear-cut economic prediction, which is, without saying too much at this point,
systematically violated.
The following pages summarize each chapter. They will sketch the motivi-
ation, the experiments, results and implications to the academic debate.
The ﬁrst essay On the Role of Limited Feedback in Voluntary Contribution
Games is based on joint work with Bernd Irlenbusch (Irlenbusch and Rilke,
2013). Both authors contributed equally to this research. The essay in chapter
2 addresses the research question how limited knowledge about the behavior
of others inﬂuences contributions in a social dilemma and how good and bad
examples, i.e., good and bad behavior of others, inﬂuences cooperation. It is
one of the most established empirical observations in experimental economics
that people cooperate when others cooperate and do not cooperate when oth-
ers do not do so (Fischbacher et al., 2001). This behavior is typically called
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conditional cooperation. For conditional cooperation to unfold, it is, how-
ever, crucial what individuals know about the behavior of others, i.e., which
feedback they receive. In laboratory experiments on public goods, subjects
normally have perfect knowledge if others cooperate or not. In most social
dilemmas outside the laboratory, however, this is obviously not the case.
This chapter experimentally investigates the eﬀects of limited feedback on
contributions in a repeated public goods game. We test whether feedback
about good examples (i.e., the maximum contribution in a period), in contrast
to bad examples (i.e., the minimum contribution), induces higher contribu-
tions. When the selection of feedback is non-transparent to the subjects, good
examples boost cooperation, while bad examples hamper cooperation. No sig-
niﬁcant diﬀerences are observed between providing good or bad examples when
the feedback selection rule is transparent. The results of this experiment have
several implications for organizational designers. In order to achieve eﬃcient
team production, cooperation or voluntary contributions the data highlights
that the management of beliefs is important. This is potentially has particular
importance in situations where sanctioning institutions to foster cooperative-
ness are undesirable or simply impossible to implement.
The second essay The Eﬀects of Incentives on Honesty in Tournaments is
based on a joint work with Julian Conrads, Bernd Irlenbusch, Anne Schielke,
and Gari Walkowitz (Conrads et al., 2014). All authors contributed equally to
this work. Chapter 3 focuses on how tournament incentives aﬀect individuals'
inclination to act dishonestly. Tournaments, i.e., payment systems that are
based on relative performance comparisons, are ubiquitous in corporate life.
Under this kind of incentive, a group of employees works for a period of time
and is then paid based on the relative performance of the group members.
One employee of the group might be promoted to a higher hierarchy level.
Typically, the strength of tournament incentives results from the diﬀerence in
the payoﬀ for the winner and loser of the tournament, i.e., the prize spread
(Lazear and Rosen, 1981; Grund and Sliwka, 2005). Harbring and Irlenbusch
(2011) study experimentally that as the diﬀerence between winner and loser
prize increases working eﬀorts increase. The results of their experiment show,
however, that workers invest more in sabotage activities as the prize diﬀerence
increases.
Despite the fact that these types of payment schemes oﬀer an incentive to
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destruct co-workers eﬀorts, in Chapter 3 of this thesis we study their impact
on being dishonest, which has been largely neglected in the existing research.
We apply the die rolling experiment of Fischbacher and Heusi (2013) to a two-
player tournament incentive scheme. In three treatments we vary the diﬀerence
between the winner's and the loser's prize from one to ﬁve Euro. Irrespective
of the price diﬀerence solely selﬁsh-minded individuals should always lie to the
full extent across our treatments. We observe, however, that lying seems to
be more pronounced as the price spread increases. Moreover, we see that a
considerable number of individuals remain honest, irrespective of the strength
of the incentives, and a substantial fraction of individuals lie incompletely. This
means that they do not report the highest possible output. These results give
indicate the existence of heterogeneity in individuals' propensity to lie under
tournament incentives. It is an essential feature of this experiment that we vary
the prize spread but keep the sum of prizes constant. The implementation of
tournament incentives is thus equally costly across treatments. Increasing the
prize spread, however, comes with the potential downside of pronounced lying.
In Chapter 3 we further discuss possible implications of lying for organizations.
The third essay On Equity Rules in Ultimatum Bargaining with Asymmet-
ric Outside Options is a joint work with Heike Hennig-Schmidt, Bernd Irlen-
busch and Gari Walkowitz (Hennig-Schmidt, Irlenbusch, Rilke, and Walkowitz,
2014). All authors contributed equally to this project. Chapter 4 tests how
outside options inﬂuence notions of fairness and equity in bargaining. Outside
options, i.e., the alternatives an individual has to the existing negotiations, are
arguably the most important determinant for bargaining behavior. Football
players receive oﬀers from various clubs, managers have multiple proposals
from diﬀerent ﬁrms, professors collect bids from several universities before
entering wage negotiations. Although professional bargaining manuals recom-
mend that negotiators should strive for a multitude of outside options, their
inﬂuence on fairness in bargaining is not well understood.
We experimentally investigate multiple notions of equity in ultimatum bar-
gaining with asymmetric outside options. Building on the generalized equity
principle formulated by Selten (1978), we derive three diﬀerent equity rules
that can explain 43% of all proposals. Our between- and within-subject de-
sign allows us to further show that proposers use diﬀerent equity rules and
apply them in a self-serving manner. They tend to follow the rules that sug-
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gest the highest payoﬀ for them. The equity principle also explains 26% of
responders' minimal acceptable oﬀers. As for proposers, their choices tend to
exhibit a pattern of self-serving behavior. Combined, these tendencies lead to
high ineﬃciency resulting from frequent rejections.
The last essay, The Inﬂuence of Framing and Publicity on Moralistic Pun-
ishment, in Chapter 5 investigates how framing of actions eﬀects moralistic
punishment. I conduct an experiment to examine the role of framing and
publicity in motivating altruistic punishment. I consider a modiﬁed version
of a dictator game where a third-party observes a dictator's behavior and can
punish her. I vary how the dictator's action is framed (either as giving money
to a recipient or taking money from the recipient) and whether the recipient
(as a potential victim of unfair behavior) is informed about the punishment or
not. Our results suggest that, although the payoﬀ consequences for dictator
and recipient are constant, third-parties are more likely to punish dictators
when dictators give nothing compared to when they take everything. This
result emerges only when third-parties can signal their altruistic behavior to
the recipients.
Taken together, the four experimental studies of this thesis examine that
individuals' ethicality, measured as cooperativeness, honesty or fairness, is
predictably malleable and depends on incentives, as well as more subtle factors
like feedback or framing. In the following chapters the essays will be presented
in detail.
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2 On the Role of Limited
Feedback in Voluntary
Contribution Games
How should feedback provision be designed to foster cooperation in public
goods settings? One of the most established observations from the experi-
mental research on public goods games is that the behavior of a majority of
individuals can be described as conditionally cooperative, i.e., people cooper-
ate when others do likewise. However, cooperation levels decline, as the game
is repeated over time. The cause of this decline has recently been studied.
Fischbacher and Gächter (2010), Neugebauer et al. (2009) and Muller et al.
(2008) ﬁnd that subjects do not match the other players' behavior perfectly.
More precisely, they tend to contribute on average a bit less than they think
their peers do and therefore contributions go down. This behavior is called
imperfect conditional cooperation.1 To explain how this behavioral tendency
unfolds, it is important to understand more about how feedback contributions
of others inﬂuence the decision to contribute to a public good.2 Such investi-
gation would oﬀer valuable insights into designing eﬀective feedback provision.
Typically, in repeated public goods experiments scholars provide partici-
pants with feedback about the sum of contributions or feedback about the con-
tribution of each individual group member. However, in many social dilemmas
This chapter is based on joint work with Bernd Irlenbusch (Irlenbusch and Rilke, 2013).
1Neugebauer et al. (2009) use the term selﬁshly-biased conditional cooperation. Because we
think that the underlying motive of not perfectly cooperating could have several reasons
we stick to the term imperfect conditional corporation throughout the paper.
2Previously, experimental economists put huge eﬀorts into investigating several mechanisms
that stabilize contributions behavior over time. Chaudhuri (2011) provides an excellent
survey of laboratory experiments on this topic. Research focuses on punishment (Fehr
and Gächter, 2000; Gürerk et al., 2006; Xiao and Houser, 2011), incentives (Bracht et al.,
2008), communication (Isaac and Walker, 1988; Bochet et al., 2006), sorting and group
formation (Gächter and Thöni, 2005; Page et al., 2005; Ahn et al., 2009), moral suasion
(Masclet et al., 2003) and recommendations (Chaudhuri and Paichayontvijit, 2010) with
eﬀects on contribution levels.
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outside the laboratory, one has only limited information about the behavior of
others.3 Think, for example, of large teams where the individual contributions
are not easily observable. Alternatively, think of individual eﬀorts to preserve
the cleanliness of public parks or train stations. In these situations, it is not
always clear what others contributed to sustain the common good. Organi-
zations and governments use the limited availability of feedback and initiate
campaigns that selectively highlight appropriate or inappropriate behavior to
facilitate cooperation. Awards like 'Employee of the month' in organizations
or image campaigns in cities are vivid examples of these attempts. So far,
little systematic evidence indicates how limited feedback about contributions
aﬀects cooperation in a repeated setting: How do good and bad examples of
behavior inﬂuence cooperation and beliefs? How does the awareness of how
the feedback is selected shape the inclination to voluntary cooperate? We deal
with these questions in this paper.
We study a voluntary contribution game in which subjects receive feedback
about a single contribution in the group, and vary the way in which this partic-
ular contribution is selected as feedback. Our experiment focuses on two simple
feedback selection rules: good and bad examples. Subjects in our experiment
receive feedback either about the maximum contribution (good example) or the
minimum contribution (bad example) of the previous period in the group. Ad-
ditional to the feedback selection rule we vary the subjects' knowledge of which
rule is applied, i.e., the awareness of the feedback selection rule (transparent)
or not (non-transparent). This experimental design has unique features that
enable us to shed light on the questions stated above. First, we investigate
cooperation when subjects are (not) aware of how the feedback is selected.
Given the previously observed pattern of imperfect conditional cooperation,
we hypothesize that it is easier to deviate from the given feedback and free-
ride a bit when knowing that good examples are set forth rather than when
the feedback selection rule is unknown. On the other hand, when knowing
that bad examples will be exposed feedback is likely to induce lower bounds of
what is an appropriate contribution. Second, we are able to understand more
about the impact of observed good and bad past behavior, because investigate
3Only recently there emerged a literature where limited feedback plays a role in public
goods experiments (Grechenig et al., 2010; Ambrus and Greiner, 2012; Irlenbusch and
Ter Meer, 2013; Bayer et al., 2013; Hartig et al., 2013).
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a repeated social interaction. Most ﬁeld studies on related issues (e.g. Cialdini
et al., 1990) focus on the inﬂuence of a one-time intervention. Third, our ex-
perimental setup resembles social dilemma situations outside the lab in which
information about peer behavior is limited but feedback is provided selectively.
We observe that when the feedback selection rule is not transparent good
examples have a clearly positive eﬀect on average contributions. The posi-
tive eﬀect of good examples is not observed when subjects are aware of the
feedback selection rule that is applied. When bad examples are provided as
feedback, knowing explicitly which feedback selection rule is at work increases
cooperation compared to a situation where the feedback selection rule is not
transparent. Our results also show that matching the feedback is more likely
when the feedback selection procedure is non-transparent. Furthermore, as
beliefs inﬂuence contributions, we ﬁnd that non-transparency of feedback in-
ﬂuences belief formation that might ultimately lead to the observed diﬀerences
between good and bad examples.
This essay is organized as follows. Section 2.1 explains our experimental
design. The results are presented in Section 2.2. In Section 2.3 we discuss
the connection to existing research and potential applications. Section 2.4
concludes the study.
2.1 Experimental design
Our experiment consists of a 10-period standard linear public goods game with
partner matching. All players are newly endowed with 20 points in each of the
periods. Points may be allocated to the public good or kept in the private
account. Keeping the money yields a private marginal return of one, while
contributing to the public good delivers a marginal per capita return of 0.4.
Thus, it is a dominant strategy not to contribute. The payoﬀ pii for each
participant in each period is determined by
pii = 20− ci + 0.4 ·
4∑
j=1
cj,
where ci represents the amount contributed of individual i.
4
4Experimental instructions and control questions are taken from Fehr and Gächter (2000)
and expanded by one paragraph (see appendix). Original instructions were in German.
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One period of our experiment consists of three diﬀerent stages with three
separate screens. First, a subject has to decide about the number of points
that she is willing to contribute to the project. On a second screen, a subject
is asked to state her beliefs about the average contribution of the other three
group members during this period.5 In a third stage, all subjects in a group
receive the same feedback about a single contribution in the group and no other
information.6 In the instructions and on the screens it is clearly indicated that
all subjects in the group of four receive the same feedback and that the shown
contribution can potentially be their own. Our experiment varies the feedback
selection rule and the transparency of the selection rule.
Treatments
We implement six treatments using a 3x2 factorial design. We utilize three
feedback selection rules. Subjects receive feedback either about the maxi-
mum (MAX) or minimum (MIN) contribution in a group. In addition, in
a reference treatment (RAND), subjects receive feedback about a randomly
selected contribution. We employ one of the feedback selection rules either
non-transparent, i.e., subjects were not informed about the speciﬁc character
of feedback, or transparent where subjects know which type of feedback they
received.7 To isolate the eﬀect of the speciﬁc feedback selection rule subjects
receive no other information between the periods. An overview of the treat-
ments and their feedback conditions is shown in Table 2.1.
Procedure
The experiment was conducted at the Cologne Laboratory for Economic Re-
search (CLER) in six sessions. A session lasted for about one hour. The
5Belief elicitation was incentivized: If subjects either correctly predicted the average of the
other three participants or their predictions lied in a +/− 0.5 range of the real average
they received 5 points. Since feedback about the accuracy of their estimation may have
inﬂuenced subjects' decisions in the following periods, we delivered feedback about the
accuracy of their prediction at the end of the experiment.
6Feedback on earnings in the period is provided at the end of the last period.
7When the feedback selection rule is non-transparent the exact wording of the feedback
on the screen was A contribution of one person was: XX, whereas when transparent
feedback was presented the sentence The person with the maximum (minimum) con-
tribution has contributed: XX was displayed. For the feedback selection rule RAND it
said A randomly drawn contribution of one person was: XX.
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Table 2.1: Overview of treatments
Treatment
Feedback Number of Number of
selection rule Participants Groups
Non-transparent Feedback Selection
MIN min(c1,...,c4) 28 7
RAND rand(c1,...,c4) 32 8
MAX max(c1,...,c4) 32 8
Transparent Feedback Selection
MIN min(c1,...,c4) 32 8
RAND rand(c1,...,c4) 32 8
MAX max(c1,...,c4) 32 8
Notes: In MIN under non-transparent feedback selection we are lacking one observation due to subjects
not showing up to the experiment.
experiment was computerized with the software z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007).
One point was worth 0.04e. 188 subjects were recruited with the software
ORSEE (Greiner, 2003). Individuals' earnings of each period are summed up
and paid out at the end. Subjects earned 12.68e on average, including 2.5e
show-up fee. After ten periods of the public goods game a questionnaire was
distributed.
2.2 Results
In this section we present the results of our experiment.8 The left panels of
Table 2.2 show the average contributions beliefs and feedback. The analysis of
contributions leads to our ﬁrst observation:
Observation 1: Average contributions are highest when the maxi-
mum contribution is provided as feedback and the feedback selection
rule remains non-transparent.
First, we compare the contributions of the diﬀerent feedback selection rules
for non-transparent feedback. In MAX, the average contributions are by 9.2
8All reported signiﬁcance levels are based on two-sided tests. If not mentioned otherwise
non-parametric comparisons are conducted with group averages as independent observa-
tions. Standard errors in our regressions are clustered on independent subjects groups.
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Table 2.2: Average contributions, beliefs, and feedback
Treatment Contributions Beliefs Feedback
Non-transparent Feedback Selection
MIN 4.02 3.25 0.91
RAND 7.39 8.48 7.66
MAX 13.21 15.51 18.85
Transparent Feedback Selection
MIN 7.44 7.5 2.89
RAND 5.61 5.56 4.45
MAX 8.53 10.74 14.7
Notes: In this table we display average values of contributions, beliefs, feedback over all ten periods.
(5.8) points higher than in MIN (RAND). This diﬀerence is highly signiﬁcant
(vs. MIN: p=.0012, vs. RAND: p=.0087, Mann Whitney U test, henceforth
MWU test). In the transparent feedback selection environment we ﬁnd no
statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerence between average contributions.
A feedback selection rule seems to have diﬀerent eﬀects on contributions, de-
pending on whether this selection rule is transparent. Comparing transparent
against non-transparent feedback selection reveals that contributions in the
former are 4.7 points lower than in the latter (p=.0274) when the feedback se-
lection rule is MAX. We ﬁnd indications that contributions for MIN are higher
by 3.4 points when subjects know the feedback selection rule (p=.0641).9
9No such diﬀerence could be found when comparing both RAND feedback selection mecha-
nisms. Additional regressions in the appendix in Table 2.5 controlling for the period and
the actual feedback provided further conﬁrm this observation. Table 2.6 in the appendix
gives an overview of all non-parametric comparisons.
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Figure 2.1: Development of contributions over time
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Figure 2.1 shows the development of contributions over time. Contributions
initially start at around 10 points10 and then decline as the game proceeds.
There is, however, one exception. When the maximum is displayed and the
feedback selection rule is non-transparent contributions are relatively stable
over time and exhibit only slight endgame eﬀects. To test this statistically, we
take the average contribution from every group from the period 1 to 5 and 6 to
10 and compare the distribution of these averages with a Wilcoxon signed rank
test for matched pairs for every treatment separately. All tests yield p-values
smaller than .0357, except for non-transparent feedback selection MAX. Here
we cannot reject the hypothesis that the average contributions between those
two parts of the experiment are similar (p=.2076).
Thus, leaving the feedback mechanism non-transparent has a positive eﬀect
on contributions when the feedback selection is the maximum contribution,
but a negative eﬀect when the minimum contribution is provided as feedback.
What may be potential reasons for the diﬀerent eﬀects of non-transparency
over the feedback selection mechanism? The ﬁrst reason we are going to explore
is the likelihood of matching the previously observed feedback.
10According to a Kruskal Wallis test we ﬁnd no diﬀerence in the distribution of subjects' ﬁrst
period contributions between the feedback selection rules for non-transparent (p=.3628)
and transparent (p=.6255) feedback selection.
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Figure 2.2: Relative frequencies of perfect matches over time
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Observation 2: Subjects match the feedback more often when the
selection rule (either MAX or MIN) is non-transparent.
For every group, we calculate the fraction of contributions that are exactly
equal to the previous feedback (see lower right panel of Table 2.6 in the ap-
pendix).11 When the maximum contribution is displayed, we ﬁnd that, on
average, more than half of the contributions (.51) match the previously seen
feedback when the feedback selection rule is non-transparent rather than trans-
parent (.22, p=.010, MWU test). Perfectly matching the feedback seems to be
more pronounced when the minimum contribution is provided as feedback. In
the case of non-transparent feedback selection .65 of the contributions match
perfectly, while .38 of the contributions match the feedback if the selection is
transparent. This is in line with results from previous experiments (e.g. Cro-
son and Shang, 2008; Samak and Sheremata, 2013) which ﬁnd that in social
dilemmas feedback over low contributions has a inﬂuence than other feedback
forms. Our results suggest that in MIN matching the feedback is more frequent
when it is non-transparent than when it is transparent (p=.0419).12 Compar-
11Note that this classiﬁcation is rather conservative. To test the eﬃcacy of the diﬀerent feed-
back selection rules we stick to this classiﬁcation since imperfect conditional cooperators
tend to contribute slightly less than the feedback, which decreases contributions.
12In treatments RAND the opposite is the case: Matching is more likely when subjects
know that they are aware of the feedback (p=.0155).
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Table 2.3: Perfect matching of contributions and feed-
back
Dependent variable
1 if Contributioni;t = Feedbackt−1
MAX MIN RAND
Independent variables
Period 0.00432 0.0491*** 0.00667
(0.00751) (0.00964) (0.00786)
1 if Non-transparent 0.280*** 0.217** -0.186***
(0.107) (0.104) (0.0653)
Feedbackt−1 0.00231 -0.0630*** -0.0149***
(0.0171) (0.0154) (0.00462)
Observations 576 540 576
R2 .07 .216 .071
Notes: Marginal eﬀects of a probit regression with data from period 2
to 10. Robust standard errors (clustered on groups) in parentheses. "1
if Non-transparent" takes the value 1 if the feedback selection rule was
non-transparent and 0 if not (transparent). ∗∗∗ Signiﬁcance at p<.01, ∗∗
Signiﬁcance at p<.05, ∗ Signiﬁcance at p<.1.
ing the fraction of contributions that perfectly match the feedback, however,
we ﬁnd no signiﬁcant diﬀerence (p=.1715) between MAX and MIN conditions
for non-transparent feedback selection. The same holds true for transparent
feedback (p=.1307).
Figure 2.2 illustrates this observation for the complete course of the ex-
periment. We display the frequency of contributions perfectly matching the
feedback across our treatments and periods. We see that matching the feed-
back is more likely under the non-transparent feedback selection (left panel).
Moreover, we observe that the fraction of subjects matching the feedback in-
creases over time when the minimum contribution is provided, i.e., free-riding
becomes more and more frequent at the end of the experiment.
Probit regressions predicting whether a contribution perfectly matches the
feedback or not further elaborate on this issue and conﬁrm the results of the
non-parametric estimates. In Table 2.3, the signiﬁcantly positive coeﬃcients
for the dummy variable 1 if Non-transparent in model (MAX) and in model
(MIN) conﬁrm an increasing likelihood of imitating the previously seen feed-
back when subjects do not know the feedback selection rule. The positive
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signiﬁcant coeﬃcient for Period (in model MIN) captures the visual impres-
sion from Figure 2.2 that matching becomes more and more frequent in later
periods when the feedback selection rule is MIN.
Another possible explanation for the treatment eﬀect stated in observation
1 concerns the eﬀect of beliefs on contributions.13 As already shown, in other
studies, beliefs and contributions are usually highly correlated (Fischbacher
and Gächter, 2010; Neugebauer et al., 2009). As a ﬁrst rough statistical mea-
sure of the inﬂuence of beliefs on contributions, we correlate both ﬁgures. Ac-
cording to the Spearman rank correlation test average group contributions and
average group beliefs are highly signiﬁcantly correlated when pooling all treat-
ments (ρ=.92, p=.0001).14 As beliefs are likely to impact contributions it is
important to understand how beliefs are inﬂuenced by the respective feedback.
When correlating average group beliefs and average previously provided feed-
back we ﬁnd a strong positive relationship (ρ=.82, p=.0001).15 This bi-variate
analysis, however, does not uncover the underlying dynamics of the belief for-
mation process that ultimately might lead to the observed diﬀerences between
our treatments. Therefore, with the help of a regression analysis we estimate
the belief formation process for every feedback selection rule separately. Our
model follows Fischbacher and Gächter (2010). To explain the beliefs in pe-
riod t, we use the previous belief (Beliefi;t−1), the feedback subjects received
during the preceding period (Feedbackt−1) and the period (Period). Addi-
tionally, to capture the eﬀects of a non-transparent feedback selection rule, we
include a dummy variable 1 if Non-transparent. The results are displayed in
Table 2.4. In all speciﬁcations we ﬁnd that Beliefi;t−1 and Feedbackt−1 are
highly signiﬁcantly positive.16 Thus, we make our last observation:
13A comparison of average group beliefs (see upper right panel of Table 2.6) between non-
transparent and transparent feedback selection goes into the same direction as the com-
parison of contributions in observation 1. For MAX (MIN) beliefs are higher (lower)
by 4.77 (4.25) points when the feedback selection rule is non-transparent rather than
transparent (MAX: p=.0117, MIN: p=.0109, MWU test). Interpreting beliefs is typi-
cally diﬃcult due to problems of potential endogeneity. Note that in order to attenuate
this problem, we incentivized beliefs, as described in Section 2.1.
14Coeﬃcients of GLS regressions explaining contributions with beliefs (and a constant)
separately for each treatment are all positive and signiﬁcant at least of a .75 magnitude.
15Coeﬃcients of GLS regressions explaining beliefs with previous feedback (and a constant)
separately for each treatment are all positive and signiﬁcant at least of a .33 magnitude.
16It has to be noted, that in Fischbacher and Gächter (2010) the feedback subjects received
during their experiment consisted of the sum of contributions from all group members.
Nevertheless, in their regressions the ratio of coeﬃcients between previous beliefs and
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Observation 3: With MIN feedback the non-transparency of the
feedback selection rule decreases beliefs compared to when the feed-
back selection rule is transparent. With MAX feedback the eﬀect
of non-transparency tends to go in the opposite direction, i.e., non-
transparency of the feedback selection rule (slightly) increases beliefs,
compared to when the feedback selection rule is transparent.
In the model (MIN) in Table 2.4 we observe a strongly negative and signif-
icant inﬂuence of 1 if Non-transparent when the minimum contribution is
displayed as feedback. The same variable is mildly positively signiﬁcant, when
we compare non-transparent and transparent feedback selection for the maxi-
mum contribution in model (MAX). No such diﬀerence could be observed for
random feedback selection (model RAND).
Table 2.4: Explaining beliefs
Dependent variable
Beliefi;t
MAX MIN RAND
Independent variables
Beliefi;t−1 0.604*** 0.599*** 0.549***
(0.05) (0.10) (0.09)
Feedbackt−1 0.383*** 0.408*** 0.347***
(0.04) (0.08) (0.04)
Period -0.204*** 0.0391 -0.0324
(0.07) (0.07) (0.05)
1 if Non-transparent 0.780* -1.041*** 0.312
(0.43) (0.33) (0.35)
Constant -0.390 0.645 0.390
(0.57) (0.88) (0.44)
Observations 576 540 576
R2 .73 .768 .717
Notes: GLS regressions with data from period 2 to 10. Robust standard
errors (clustered on groups) in parentheses. "1 if Non-transparent" takes
the value 1 if the feedback selection rule was non-transparent and 0 if
not (transparent). ∗∗∗ Signiﬁcance at p<.01, ∗∗ Signiﬁcance at p<.05,
∗ Signiﬁcance at p<.1.
feedback appear to be very similar to ours (p. 548, Table 1).
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2.3 Discussion
Feedback in simultaneous social dilemmas
So far, only a few studies have discussed the eﬀects of feedback in social dilem-
mas. Weimann (1994) has undertaken a ﬁrst approach. He manipulated the
feedback about the average contribution, i.e., one real subject interacted with
four ﬁctitious players. In one treatment subjects were confronted with ﬁctitious
players that contributed on average 90% of the endowment in every period.
In a second treatment they received the information that on average subjects
contributed 16% all the time. Interestingly, despite the remarkable diﬀerence
in feedback between these two conditions, Weimann observed no diﬀerence in
behavior between the two conditions. As the experiment of Weimann suggests
the feedback about high average contributions not necessarily promotes co-
operation. One possible reason might be imperfect conditional cooperation.
Alternatively, subjects might not have taken the feedback seriously after hav-
ing observed that the feedback averages remained constant. In a more recent
paper, Bigoni and Suetens (2012) investigated the inﬂuence of two seemingly
identical formats of feedback. In all experimental treatments subjects received
information about the sum of contributions of their group. However, the treat-
ments diﬀered in the additional information subjects obtained. Subjects saw
the feedback on either the contribution of each group member or the earnings
of each group member. Despite the fact that these diﬀerent formats of feed-
back can easily be converted into each other contributions were signiﬁcantly
lower when earnings feedback was provided.17 They explained that the results
suggest a tendency of subjects to imitate the best performer (the subject with
the highest earnings) rather than the best contributor. The work of Hoﬀmann
et al. (2013) is more closely related to our paper. They tested the eﬀect of
centralized feedback manipulation on cooperation in a public goods setting.
In their experiment, subjects received the average contribution of the entire
group during the periods. In one of their treatments, this average was dis-
torted by exaggerating it by 25% in each round. Subjects were only informed
that the feedback might deviate from the actual average. Their results sug-
17Similar to Bigoni and Suetens (2012) Nikiforakis (2010) studied the diﬀerence between
these feedback formats but included a punishment option. His results also suggest a
negative inﬂuence of earnings feedback on cooperation but no diﬀerence in the frequency
of punishment.
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gested that this centralized feedback manipulation was indeed not eﬀective in
promoting cooperativeness. They argued that the feeling of being a sucker,
i.e., being an above average contributor, is mainly responsible for this decline.
Therefore, the researchers conducted a further treatment where above average
contributors received feedback based on their own contribution as the average
contribution of the group. All other subjects received the true average contri-
bution as feedback. As it turned out contributions were high and stable over
time. In a recent paper, Samak and Sheremata (2013) focused on the inﬂu-
ence of visibility of participants in a standard multiperiod public goods game.
In all their experimental treatments subjects received complete information
about the previous contribution of every participant in their group. Addition-
ally, the researchers provided subjects with pictures of group members that
were taken before the experiment. In some treatments, only pictures of the
highest contributors were shown and in other treatments only the pictures of
lowest contributors were exposed. They found that revealing the identity of
lowest contributors increases contributions relative to a situation in which the
identity of every group member is revealed.
Leadership in sequential social dilemmas
The topic of this paper is also related to the literature on leadership in so-
cial dilemma situations. Typically, in these studies, one member of the group,
the leader, contributes ﬁrst. All other members observe the contribution of
the leader and subsequently decide on their own contribution. Gächter and
Renner (2004) showed that the leaders' contributions actually inﬂuence fol-
lowers' contributions. Followers, however, fell short of the leaders' choices and
exploited them. Subsequent studies showed that leadership is more eﬀective
when the position of the leader is more advantageous. Güth et al. (2007),
for example, showed that leadership is particularly helpful to induce cooper-
ation, when the leader has the possibility to exclude others.18 Potters et al.
(2007) provided evidence that leadership is more eﬀective when the leader has
exclusive information about the marginal per capita return of the public good.
18In a similar vein, Rivas and Sutter (2011) showed that when subjects have the possibility
to voluntarily choose to be the leader the eﬀect of leadership is even stronger compared to
when the leader is chosen randomly. Gächter et al. (2012) nicely showed that cooperative
leaders are more eﬀective in convincing followers to follow. Gächter et al. (2010) also
compared sequential and simultaneous contributions.
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This stream of literature looks at situations in which one participant chooses
her contribution ﬁrst, which is subsequently shown to other group members
before they decide on their own contributions. At the end of a period all group
members receive feedback about all decisions from the group. In our study,
we are more interested in a limited feedback and in the way in which diﬀerent
feedback selection rules aﬀect cooperation. In our setting feedback selection is
not tied to one participant, but to the relative amount of a contribution.
Feedback on charitable giving
Providing feedback selectively in order to enhance donations was also the sub-
ject of two ﬁeld experiments of Frey and Meier (2004) and Croson and Shang
(2008).19 Both studies manipulated the information potential donors receive
about previous behavior of other donors. The former study investigated how
information about the number of students who previously contributed to a
charity organization inﬂuences giving. In the experiment of Frey and Meier
one group received feedback that more than 50% of the students gave money
to the charity while the other group knew that less than 50% contributed.
They found that students were more likely to give when they were informed
that more than 50% of their peers had contributed.
Croson and Shang (2008) contacted regular donors of a radio station and
selectively provided them with diﬀerent information about the previous con-
tribution of one other donor. Because the researchers knew how much the
participants had contributed, they were able to check how the contribution
of each donor changed with respect to the given feedback. As predicted, if
the feedback contribution was higher (lower) than the contribution of the par-
ticipant, the contribution increased (decreased). However, contributions were
much strongly inﬂuenced when the contribution feedback was lower. In a some-
what diﬀerent, but related approach, Huck and Rasul (2011) tested how the
decision to donate is inﬂuenced by the fact that potential donors know that a
very generous donor has already given a huge amount of money. It turned out
that the total amount donated was signiﬁcantly higher when participants were
informed about the generous donor compare to when they were not given this
information.
19Shang and Croson (2009) provided a broader review.
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Potential policy implications
The variety of feedback mechanisms and leadership institutions studied does
yield ambiguous evidence about how feedback inﬂuences contributions in so-
cial dilemmas. As the studies of Weimann (1994) and Hoﬀmann et al. (2013)
highlighted the credibility of feedback might be decisive for the development of
contributions. Leaders in public goods might signal what is the desired behav-
ior but they are not necessarily successful in convincing the others to follow.
Comparable ﬁeld studies on charitable giving also stressed the importance of
social information, i.e., information about the donation behavior of others.
Our study contributes to the discussion of feedback in social dilemmas and
charitable giving. Although previous experiments have shown that punishment
is a promising institution to promote cooperation (e.g. Gächter et al., 2008) in
various social dilemmas, its implementation is undesirable or simply too costly.
Think, for example, of large teams that work together in diﬀerent locations.
In these situations individual punishment might be considered as undesirable
since individual eﬀorts are diﬃcult to observe. Feedback, for instance, can be
a helpful tool to stimulate cooperation under these circumstances. The results
of our experiment suggest that providing employees with examples of good
behavior might have a positive eﬀect. However, if employees are aware that
this is a good example, they are likely to consider it as an upper bound of what
they should provide and therefore refrain from doing more. Therefore, whether
employees are aware of the feedback selection rule seems to be a decisive factor.
On the contrary, a team leader who tries to encourage employees' eﬀorts by
providing bad examples is well advised to inform them about the nature of the
feedback. If team members know that they are exposed to the bad example,
this seems to be considered as a lower bound of appropriate behavior and
prevents even lower contributions. Another domain where feedback might
have relevant consequences involves donations for charities. In the light of our
results, when generous donors are shown as feedback it might lead to higher
donation when others do not know that these are actually good examples.
2.4 Concluding remarks
In this experimental study, we consider voluntary contribution settings in
which feedback about contributions is limited. The ﬁrst limitation is that
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only one single contribution is observable as feedback. The other limitation is
that the feedback selection rule might be non-transparent, i.e., that subjects do
not know whether the feedback is the minimum, the maximum, or a randomly
selected contribution. These limitations play a role in numerous settings out-
side the lab (e.g. Croson and Shang, 2008) in which voluntary contributions
are sought, i.e., think of contributions to team endeavors where the eﬀort of
only one team member can be observed or is deliberately communicated by the
ﬁrm. However, the team members might not know whether the ﬁrm actually
chooses a good example or a random one. Alternatively, think of a charity
that seeks donations and publicizes the contribution of a previous donor.
Our setting extends the literature of repeated public goods settings in the
sense that most studies either provide detailed feedback on all individual con-
tributions or provide only aggregate feedback, like the average contributions
or the sum of contributions or the average earnings or the sum of earnings.
Instead we focus on the feedback about a single contribution, which in a sense
is less informative but is still likely to guide subsequent contribution behavior.
Admittedly, we considered only two extreme cases, assuming that the feedback
selection rule is either completely transparent or completely non-transparent
which is a simpliﬁcation to some extent. In many cases, the feedback rule is
likely to be partly transparent, i.e., one has at least some idea of whether the
minimum, the maximum or a randomly selected contribution is displayed. The
investigation of these partly transparent cases, however, is beyond the scope
of this paper.
The experimental results show that feedback about good examples increases
and stabilizes the contribution levels. To observe the positive eﬀect of good
examples, it is important that subjects are not explicitly aware that particular
good examples have been selected. When participants in our experiment know
that the maximum contribution is shown contributions decline. Interestingly,
when subjects know that they will face the minimum contribution of the group
as feedback, average contributions are higher compared to a situation when the
minimum is shown but the selection rule is non-transparent.
One potential explanation for the positive eﬀect of non-transparency of the
good example could be the notion of imperfect conditional cooperation (Fis-
chbacher and Gächter, 2010). When subjects know that good examples are
shown they match the feedback less often and contributions tend to decrease.
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Finally, we show that the transparency of the feedback selection rule has simi-
lar eﬀects on individual beliefs. Thus, our results provide ﬁrst insights into the
eﬀects of limited feedback provision in public goods settings and the design of
how to improve contributions.
2.5 Appendix
Tables and ﬁgures
Table 2.5: Explaining contributions (by information
about feedback selection)
Dependent variable
Contributioni;t
MAX MIN RAND
Independent variables
Period -0.425∗∗∗ -0.543∗∗∗ -0.476∗∗∗
(0.14) (0.07) (0.09)
1 if Non-transparent 4.006∗∗ -2.403∗∗ 0.920
(1.82) (0.96) (0.91)
Feedbackt−1 0.256∗∗ 0.606∗∗∗ 0.291∗∗∗
(0.10) (0.07) (0.06)
Constant 7.005∗∗∗ 8.289∗∗∗ 6.592∗∗∗
(1.79) (0.86) (0.96)
Observations 576 540 576
R2 .21 .372 .206
Notes: GLS regressions with robust standard errors in parentheses
(clustered on groups) for the three feedback selection rules. "1 if Non-
transparent" takes the value 1 if the feedback selection rule was non-
transparent and 0 if not (transparent). "Feedbackt−1" controls for the
contribution that subjects saw in the previous period.
∗∗∗ Signiﬁcance at p<.01, ∗∗ Signiﬁcance at p<.05, ∗ Signiﬁcance at
p<.1.
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Table 2.6: Overview of contributions, beliefs, feedback, and matching
Contributions Beliefs
Periods
Feedback
MAX RAND MIN MAX RAND MIN
selection rule
1st-10th
Non-transparent 13.21 >∗∗∗ 7.39 >∗∗ 4.02 15.51 >∗∗∗ 8.48 .>∗∗∗ 3.25
∨∗∗ ∨ ∧∗ ∨∗∗ ∨∗ ∧∗∗
Transparent 8.53 > 5.61 < 7.44 10.74 >∗∗ 5.56 .< 7.5
1st
Non-transparent 12.34 > 9.94 < 11 11.78 > 10.25 < 10.93
∨ ∧ ∧ ∨ ∨ ∧
Transparent 10.34 > 9.91 < 11.56 9.72 < 10.09 <∗ 12.63
10th
Non-transparent 9.59 >∗∗ 3.56 >∗ 3.13 13.31 >∗∗∗ 5.31 >∗∗∗ .32
∨∗ ∨ ∨∗ ∨ ∨ ∧∗∗∗
Transparent 6.28 >∗∗∗ 2.34 > 0.68 7.91 >∗ 3.31 > 3.78
Feedback Perfect matches
Periods
Feedback
MAX RAND MIN MAX RAND MIN
selection rule
1st-10th
Non-transparent 18.85 >∗∗∗ 7.66 >∗ 0.91 .51 >∗∗ .29 <∗∗ .65
∨∗∗ ∨ ∧ ∨∗∗∗ ∧∗∗ ∨∗∗
Transparent 14.7 >∗∗∗ 4.45 > 2.89 .22 <∗∗ .52 > .38
1st
Non-transparent 19.38 >∗∗∗ 12.25 >∗∗∗ 3.43 / / /
∨ ∨∗∗∗ ∨
Transparent 18.75 >∗∗∗ 6.63 >∗∗ 3.13 / / /
10th
Non-transparent 18.13 >∗∗∗ 0.75 > 0 .41 > .25 <∗∗∗ .79
∨∗ ∧ = ∨ ∧∗∗ ∨
Transparent 10.75 >∗ 1.25 >∗∗∗ 0 .25 <∗∗ .72 = .72
Notes: In this table we display average values of contributions, beliefs, feedback for diﬀerent time spans. 1st-10th represents
the average values over all ten periods. 1st and 10th stand for the average in the respective period. Signs indicate signiﬁcance
levels of a two-sided Mann Whitney U test for which the null hypothesis that there is no diﬀerence between both treatments
can be rejected.
∗∗∗ Signiﬁcance at p<.01, ∗∗ Signiﬁcance at p<.05, ∗ Signiﬁcance at p<.1.
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Experimental instructions (translated from German)
You are now participating in an economic experiment. If you read the following
instructions carefully, you can, depending on your decisions, earn a considerable
amount of money. It is therefore very important that you read these instructions
with care. The instructions which we have distributed to you are solely for your
private information. It is prohibited to communicate with the other participants
during the experiment. Should you have any questions please ask us!
During the experiment we shall not speak of Euro but rather of points. During
the experiment your entire earnings will be calculated in points. At the end of the
experiment the total amount of points you have earned will be converted to Euros
at the following rate: 1 Point = 0.04 e. At the end of the experiment your entire
earnings from the experiment will be immediately paid to you in cash.
At the beginning of the experiment the participants will be divided into groups of
four. You will therefore be in a group with 3 other participants. This group constel-
lation will stay the same throughout the entire experiment. In all, the experiment
consists of 10 periods. At the beginning of each period each participant receives 20
points. In the following we call this his or her endowment. Your task is to decide
how to use your endowment. You have to decide how many of the 20 points you
want to contribute to a joint project and how many of them to keep for yourself.
Your payment for each period can be calculated with this simple formula. If you
have any questions about that, please ask us.
Payment = Endowment - Your Contribution + 0.4·Sum of all
Contributions
This formula shows that your income consists of two parts:
1. The points which you have kept for yourself (Endowment  Your Contribution)
2. The income of the project which is 40 % of the sum of the contributions of the
group.
The income of each group member from the project is calculated in the same way, this
means that each group member receives the same income from the project. Suppose
the sum of the contributions of all group members is 60 points. In this case each
member of the group receives an income from the project of: 0.4·60 = 24 points.
If the total contribution to the project is 9 points, then each member of the group
receives an income of 0.4·9 = 3.6 points from the project.
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In each round you have the possibility to keep points for yourself or to contribute
them to the project. For each point, which you keep for yourself you earn an income
of 1 Point. Assuming you contributed this point to the project instead, then the total
contribution to the project would rise by one point. Your income from the project
would rise by 0.4·1=0.4 points. However the income of the other group members
would also rise by 0.4 points each, so that the total income of the group from the
project would rise by 1.6 points. Your contribution to the project therefore also raises
the income of the other group members. On the other hand you earn an income
for each point contributed by the other members to the project. For each point
contributed by any member you earn 0.4·1=0.4 points. After all members of your
group have made their decision, you will get the information about one contribution
of one person in your group for the previous period. Note: All group members will
get to know the contribution of the same person. The shown contribution can also be
your own contribution. All group members of your group receive after the decision
the following information:
Treatment Transparent Feedback Selection MAX:
The person with the highest contribution in your group has contributed: XX
Treatment Transparent Feedback Selection RAND:
A randomly determined contribution of a person was: XX
Treatment Transparent Feedback Selection MIN:
The person with the lowest contribution in your group has contributed: XX
Treatment Non-transparent Feedback (MAX, RAND, MIN):
A contribution of one person was: XX
Additionally, we would like you to estimate the average contribution of the other three
group members. Please note: If you estimate precisely the average contribution of
the other three group members you will get an additional payoﬀ of 0.2 e. In case of
a deviation of + / − 0.5 points you will also get 0.2 e.
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Control-questions (translated from German)
1. Each group member has an endowment of 20 points. Nobody (including your-
self) contributes any point to the project in the ﬁrst stage. How high is:
a) Your income from the ﬁrst stage?...........
b) The income of the other group members from the ﬁrst stage?...........
2. Each group member has an endowment of 20 points. You contribute 20 points
to the project in the ﬁrst stage. All other group members each contribute 20
points to the project in the ﬁrst stage. What is:
a) Your income from the ﬁrst stage?...........
b) The income of the other group members from the ﬁrst stage?...........
3. Each group member has an endowment of 20 points. The other three group
members contribute together a total of 30 points to the project.
a) What is your income from the ﬁrst stage if you contribute a further 0
points to the project?...........
b) What is your income from the ﬁrst stage if you contribute a further 15
points to the project?...........
4. Each group member has an endowment of 20 points. You contribute 8 points
to the project.
a) What is your income from the ﬁrst stage if the other group members
together contribute a further total of 7 points to the project?...........
b) What is your income from the stage if the other group members together
contribute a further total of 22 points to the project?...........
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3 The Eﬀects of Incentives on
Honesty in Tournaments
Introducing competition among employees, e.g., for a bonus, is a tool used by
designers of organizational incentive schemes to increase eﬀort provision. Even
if such tournament incentives are not explicitly imposed, e.g., by payment
schemes, tournaments are implicitly prevalent in basically all organizations.
For example, promotions in hierarchies can be interpreted as tournament com-
petition among employees. Previous research has theoretically (Lazear and
Rosen, 1981; Grund and Sliwka, 2005), and empirically (Harbring and Lünser,
2008) shown the eﬀort enhancing eﬀect of such tournament incentives. The
downside of competitive incentives, however, is linked to employees' potential
engagement in unethical behavior to win the tournament. Especially in situa-
tions when eﬀort provision or outcomes are not fully observable and veriﬁable,
agents might be tempted to forge results. A growing strand of literature has
shown unethical conduct under tournament incentives, e.g., less helping and
greater sabotaging of opponents (see Carpenter et al., 2010; Harbring and Ir-
lenbusch, 2011). Unethical behavior can also be observed under other types of
compensations schemes, e.g., goal-setting and team-incentives (see Schweitzer
et al., 2004; Shalvi et al., 2011; Conrads et al., 2013). Cadsby et al. (2010) com-
pares a tournament scheme to other incentives schemes without particularly
investigating speciﬁc tournament types.
In this paper we concentrate on ethical conduct, i.e., employees' inclination
to honestly report their performance, in diﬀerent tournaments. We are partic-
ularly interested in how honesty is aﬀected by increasing competition through
varying the prize spread. Fischbacher and Heusi (2013) ﬁnd that individuals
systematically overreport the true value of a private die-roll when the reported
This chapter is based on joint work with Julian Conrads, Bernd Irlenbusch, Anne Schielke,
and Gari Walowitz and has recently been published in Economics Letters (Conrads et al.,
2014).
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number determines their individual pay. We extend their experimental de-
sign to a simple two-player tournament incentive scheme with varying prize
spreads between the winner and the loser. Thereby, we increase the degree of
competition among the two players in order to analyze its eﬀect on honesty.
If an individual has no costs of lying and is only interested in maximizing
her own payoﬀ she will always overreport her performance in tournaments.
The growing literature on lying aversion (Gneezy, 2005; Mazar et al., 2008;
Sutter, 2009; Kartik, 2009; Erat and Gneezy, 2012; Fischbacher and Heusi,
2013), however, has shed doubts on these assumptions. For example, Gneezy
et al. (2013) classify subjects into liar-types with diﬀerent lying costs, i.e., they
ﬁnd types that are totally honest or dishonest, respectively, and types that
condition their lies on the given incentive structure. Gibson et al. (2013) also
highlight the existence of heterogeneous preferences for truthfulness. Their
studies underline the intuition that people diﬀer in their perceived cost of
lying. In particular, their results suggest that people experience either no
costs of lying or high ﬁxed costs. With respect to these ﬁndings, the aim of our
study is to provide designers of incentives schemes with empirical insights into
the potential adverse eﬀects of a presumably eﬀort enhancing compensation
scheme.
3.1 Experimental design
Subjects are instructed that their payment for ﬁlling in a questionnaire will
be based on a production output pi randomly determined by rolling a fair
6-sided die.1 We intentionally induce subjects' production output by a ran-
dom procedure to abstract from concerns that lying behavior is inﬂuenced by
subjects' production abilities (Charness et al., 2013). In all treatments, the
production output pi of subject i equals the number di shown on the die if
di ∈ {1, . . . , 5}, whereas a die roll of di = 6 results in a production output
pi = 0. In order to implement a tournament we extend the game by Fis-
chbacher and Heusi (2013) in the following way: subjects are randomly and
anonymously matched in groups of two, and each subject privately rolls her
die such that nobody apart from her, i.e., neither the experimenter nor any
1The experimental instructions can be found in the appendix. The original instructions
are in German.
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other subject, can observe the production output pi. Then, each group mem-
ber individually submits a report ri of her production output where ri does
not have to be equal to pi. Production outputs reported by the two group
members are compared by the experimenter. The group member who submit-
ted the higher reported production output receives the winner prize w, while
the other group member receives the loser prize l, with w > l. If both group
members submit the same report, the player to receive w is determined by a
50/50 random draw. Within our three experimental conditions we vary the
prize spread ∆ = w − l from 1 to 5: in treatment T5 the winner receives 5
while the loser gets nothing, in treatment T3 the winner receives 4 while the
loser gets 1, and in treatment T1 the winner gets 3 while the loser receives 2.
Our treatments are designed such that they have several characteristics in
common: ﬁrst, on average subjects earn 2.5 whatever they report. Second, if
all subjects report their true production output, the expected payoﬀ of each
subject is 2.5. Third, if both players report the maximum production output
of 5, their expected payoﬀ also equals 2.5. Fourth, the sum of winner and loser
prizes and hence the cost of implementing the respective tournament is equal
to 5 across all experimental conditions.
As indicated above, the aim of our study is to examine whether a change in
the prize spread has an impact on subjects' willingness to honestly report their
production output. Under the assumption that lying is completely costless,
it is optimal for both subjects to report the highest production output of 5
which results in expected payoﬀs of 2.5 for both players. Hence, in absence of
lying costs, the prize spread should not inﬂuence subjects' reports and hence
we should not observe any treatment diﬀerences. If we assume that subjects
incur lying costs, i.e., if a subject's utility diminishes by a certain amount
whenever she submits a reported production output that is diﬀerent from the
true production output, her willingness to be honest depends on her lying costs
and potential gains from lying. Since the latter is not independent from prize
spread ∆, an increase in the prize spread across our experimental conditions
may well reduce honesty.
A total of 478 students (with a mean age of 24 and 54 % being female)
participated in our experiment in the laboratories of the University of Bonn
and the University of Cologne, and were recruited via ORSEE (Greiner, 2003).
After privately rolling their die and jotting down their report on a sheet of
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paper, subjects were asked to ﬁll in the questionnaire. At the end of the
session participants were privately paid at a conversion rate of 1e per prize
unit. Following Fischbacher and Heusi (2013) we ran our experiment after
diﬀerent other experimental sessions.2
3.2 Results
Figure 3.1 depicts the distribution of reported production outputs across treat-
ments. The dashed line represents the expected relative frequency of the true
production output. Evidently, the observed distributions markedly diﬀer from
this benchmark.
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Figure 3.1: Distribution of reported production outputs. The dashed line indi-
cates the expected relative frequency of the true reported produc-
tion output.
To address our research question we need to compare the reported produc-
tion outputs across treatments. In treatment T1 we observe the lowest average
reported production output (rT1=3.42).
3 Increasing the prize spread by 2 units
2The preceding experimental sessions consisted of standard experimental games like dic-
tator, ultimatum or public goods games. To counteract potential spill-over eﬀects we
balanced our three treatments over the diﬀerent types of preceding experiments.
3Note, that in the baseline treatment of Fischbacher and Heusi (2013) - which essentially
resembles a piece-rate incentive scheme - an average of rFHH =3.51 is observed. Sta-
tistically, there is no signiﬁcant diﬀerence in reported production outputs between their
baseline treatment and T1.
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in T3 enhances the average reported production output to rT3=3.71. However,
the highest average reported production output of rT5=3.86 can be found in
T5 - the treatment with the highest prize spread of 5. Although we cannot rule
out that some subjects lie to their own disadvantage (as we do not observe the
true production outputs) there seems to be a tendency that subjects lie more
the higher the prize spread is by exaggerating their true production output.
An overview of the results can be found in Table 3.1.
Table 3.1: Overview of treatments and results
Treatments w l n (% female) r¯Tk ri=0 ri=1 ri=2 ri=3 ri=4 ri=5
T1 3 2 159 (56%) 3.42 .07−−− .11−−− .14−−− .08−−− .23+++ .38+++
∧∗∗
T3 4 1 159 (57%) 3.71 .07−−− .06−−− .09−−− .11−−− .20+++ .47+++
∧∗
T5 5 0 160 (50%) 3.86 .05−−− .07−−− .07−−− .10−−− .21+++ .50+++
∨∗∗∗
T1 3 2 159 (56%) 3.42 .07−−− .11−−− .14−−− .08−−− .23+++ .38+++
Notes: n stands for the number of observations. w(l) is the winner (loser) prize. r¯ is the average reported production output.
Stars show the signiﬁcance of a two-sided Mann-Whitney U test (∗ = 10%-level, ∗∗ = 5%-level, ∗∗∗ = 1%-level). Plus and minus
signs display the signiﬁcance of a one-sided binomial test indicating that the observed relative frequency is smaller (larger) than
1
6
−−−(+ + +)=10%-level, −−−(+ + +)=5%-level, −−−(+ + +)=1%-level. The number of observations is uneven, because
we exclude subjects that already took part in die rolling experiments at the laboratory in Cologne.
According to a Jonckheere-Terpstra Test the hypothesis that there is no
diﬀerence in reported production outputs can be rejected in favor of the hy-
pothesis that reported production is increasing in the prize spread (p=.0064,
one-sided). Pairwise comparisons of the distribution of reported production
outputs show higher values in T3 compared to T1 (p=.0464, Mann-Whitney
U test, one-sided), and in T5 compared to T1 (p=.0064, Mann-Whitney U test,
one-sided). A pairwise comparison between T3 and T5 yields no signiﬁcant
diﬀerence (p=.2114).4
According to a Jonckheere-Terpstra Test, reporting the highest possible pro-
4Interestingly, we ﬁnd that women report signiﬁcantly lower production outputs compared
to men in T3 (p=.0001, Mann-Whitney U test, two-sided) and T5 (p=.0153, two-sided).
When the prize spread is rather small (T1) no diﬀerence between men and women is
observed. This supports observations from the literature on gender diﬀerences in lying
behavior (Dreber and Johannesson, 2008).
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duction output ri=5 is more likely as the price spread increases (p=.0139,
one-sided). Pairwise comparisons of the fraction of subjects reporting ri=5
between treatments yields a signiﬁcant diﬀerence between T5 and T1 (p=.027,
χ2-test). Comparing T5 against T3 and T3 against T1 yields no statistical
signiﬁcant diﬀerences (p=.536, p=.112). In all treatments the frequencies of
the reported production output of ri=4 exceed the benchmark threshold of .16
(p<.09 for all treatments, binomial test, one-sided). Interestingly, the number
of subjects reporting 4 does not statistically diﬀer between treatments (p=.86,
χ2-test). In addition, we observe a positive fraction of subjects (T1:.07; T3:.07;
T5:.05) reporting production outputs of zeros. According to a χ2-test there is
no signiﬁcant diﬀerence across treatments regarding the fractions of subjects
who report zeros (p=.717).
3.3 Concluding remarks
Lying, as compared to other unethical activities has been mostly overlooked
when studying the eﬀectiveness of tournament incentives. This might be due
to the fact that economists often consider lying to be costless. By focusing on
the role of honesty in tournaments, this study augments the small literature
on the interplay of incentive schemes and ethical behavior. Our experiment
extends the simple and widely used die rolling game paradigm introduced by
Fischbacher and Heusi (2013) to a two-player tournament and varies the dif-
ference between winner and loser prize. We ﬁnd evidence that a larger prize
spread increases subjects' propensity to be dishonest. However, we also ﬁnd
that not all subjects report the highest possible production output and the frac-
tion of subjects who (truthfully) reports a production output of zero does not
change with the prize spread. Thus, even in the face of competitive incentives
a considerable fraction of subjects appears to be reluctant to be untruthful to
the full extent. Taken together, these results suggest individual heterogeneity
of lying costs (Gneezy et al., 2013; Gibson et al., 2013). When implementing
tournament incentives, organizations should be aware of potential ethical mis-
conduct, for example dishonesty of employees. In fact, employees' dishonest
behavior might result in ineﬃcient outcomes. For example, sales people who
deceive their customers in order to win a bonus might harm a corporation's
reputation, and employees' veiling of mistakes or overstatement of skills may
34
hinder the organization to learn how to improve. Hence, in order to prevent
the occurrence of ineﬃciencies, designers of incentive schemes should be espe-
cially vigilant when considering to distribute a ﬁxed amount of money among
their employees by employing relative performance measures that are not fully
observable or veriﬁable. Unethical behavior in competitive situations can have
many facets and lying over one's own performance is only one of them. Sab-
otage, oﬃce politics and employee theft are other possible scenarios. Taken
together the study at hand and the existing literature calls for a more holistic
investigation in order to gain a deeper understanding of moral transgressions
in the workplace.
3.4 Appendix
Experimental instructions (translated from German)
Statistical Investigation
In order to do a statistical investigation (which has nothing to do with the
previous experiment) we ask you for answering some questions. To determine
your payout for answering the following questions, we ﬁrstly want you to throw
a dice. If you roll a 1, 2, 3, 4 or 5 you will get the corresponding numbers
of the dice as points. If you throw a 6 you will get 0 points. Furthermore,
you are randomly matched to another participant of the experiment. The
participant in the diad having more points will get T1{3} T3{4} T5{5} Euro
as payout. The other one will get T1{2} T3{1} T5{0} Euro as payout. If
both participants have equal number of points, the probability of getting paid
5 Euros is 50 percent. Please throw the dice now (you are obligated to write
down the ﬁrst rolled number, afterwards you are allowed to roll the dice another
times to check it for fairness).
Write down here the number you initially rolled:
Please fold the sheet after ﬁnishing the exercise. The sheets are collected
after all participants have ﬁnished the exercise. Subsequently the questions
are distributed on additional sheets. Please, answer them carefully.
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4 On Equity Rules in
Ultimatum Bargaining with
Outside Options
Experienced negotiators are well aware of the fact that lucrative alternatives
in the case of a bargaining breakdown strengthen their own bargaining posi-
tion. Authoritative manuals of successful negotiation strategies even recom-
mend that one should strive for such outside options before entering into a
bargaining situation (Fisher and Ury, 1991; Malhotra and Bazerman, 2008;
Malhotra and Gino, 2011). Although experts and common wisdom suggest
that outside options constitute an important determinant of bargaining out-
comes, only very limited systematic research has examined bargaining behavior
when outside options are available. How do bargainers in ultimatum game like
situations take outside options into account? What happens if outside options
are asymmetric? Do diﬀerent constellations of outside options trigger diﬀerent
distribution rules? How does the constellation of outside options aﬀect the
outcome of a negotiation, and how does it aﬀect the likelihood of reaching an
agreement in the ﬁrst place?
Think, for example, of a manager searching for a new job and an employer
looking for a manager to run a new subunit. The employer needs to ﬁll the
position quickly, due to urgent customer requests. In the new job, the man-
ager would generate a certain proﬁt that could be divided between her and
the new employer. The parties have asymmetric outside options; for example,
the manager - who can always refuse the oﬀer by the employer and leave the
negotiation - holds an oﬀer from somewhere else, and the employer could re-
alize gains from outsourcing the planned activity. Let us suppose that both
This chapter is based on joint work with Heike Hennig-Schmidt, Bernd Irlenbusch, and
Gari Walowitz (Hennig-Schmidt et al., 2014). A part of the experimental sessions have
been analyzed in Rilke (2009) with a focus on how ultimatum oﬀers correlate with per-
sonality traits.
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parties have a good estimate of the value of each others' outside options (e.g.,
the potential employer might have an exact estimation of the market value of
the manager, and the manager has insider information on gains from outsourc-
ing). Do the outside options have an inﬂuence on how the proﬁt is divided?
One might think of various arguments that suggest diﬀerent divisions. For ex-
ample, one could argue that the proﬁt should be equally divided (equal split)
because both parties are needed to generate the proﬁt. Alternatively, one
might guarantee the outside options for each party and divide the remainder
equally (split the diﬀerence). A third method would be to divide the proﬁt
proportionally relative to the outside options (proportional split). Would the
negotiators follow one of these rules? If yes, which one would they apply?
In our analysis on ultimatum bargaining with outside options, we concen-
trate on the three previously discussed distribution rules. We refer to the three
rules as equity rules namely, equal split, split the diﬀerence, and proportional
split. One reason for this focus is that the relevance of these three rules has
frequently been observed in previous studies (for a survey, see Konow, 2003).
A second reason is that all three rules follow a similar logic: All three can be
derived from the generalized equity principle proposed by Selten (1978). The
generalized equity principle relies on accepted positive weights (Selten refers
to them as a `standard of comparison') assigned to each party involved in the
negotiation. The weights can reﬂect diﬀerent characteristics of the bargaining
situation, such as the number of people represented by one party, the magni-
tude of the outside options, and a measure of power or individual contributions
to a joint project in terms of money or eﬀort. A ﬁnal distribution (Selten calls
it a `standard of distribution') of an amount satisﬁes the generalized equity
principle if the ratio between the individual payoﬀ and the individual weight
is equal for all involved parties.1 In Section 4.1, we explain how the three
1The criterion of proportionality that underlies the generalized equity principle goes back
at least to Aristotle, (Nicomachean Ethics, V, 5): "Let A be a builder, B a shoemaker, C
a house, D a shoe. The builder, then, must get from the shoemaker the latter's work, and
must himself give him in return his own. If, then, ﬁrst there is a proportionate equality of
goods, and the reciprocation takes place, the result will be `equality.' If not, the bargain
is not equal, and does not hold; for there is nothing to prevent the work of the one being
better than that of the other; they must therefore be equated. Later, proportionality in
exchange was prominently featured in many disciplines, in philosophy (Soudek, 1952),
sociology (Homans, 1958; Deutsch, 1975; Cook and Hegtvedt, 1983), social psychology
(Adams, 1965; Walster et al., 1973; Greenberg, 1990; Messick, 1993; Folger, 1986) and
economics (Young, 1995; Konow, 2000; Balafoutas et al., 2013).
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equity rules can be derived from the generalized equity principle by employing
diﬀerent weights and by varying the amount to which the generalized equity
principle is applied. To keep the bargaining situation simple, we employ the
ultimatum game (Güth et al., 1982) as our workhorse.2 A proposer i and a
responder j bargain over an amount of money a. The proposer makes an oﬀer
aj ≤ a to the responder. If the responder accepts, she receives aj and the
proposer receives ai = a − aj. If the responder rejects the oﬀer, both players
receive their respective outside options, i.e., the proposer receives oi and the
responder receives oj. In the standard ultimatum game, the outside options of
both players are equal to zero (i.e., with regard to the outside options, both
players have equal bargaining strength).
A large number of experimental studies have looked into the behavior within
the standard ultimatum game and found a clear predominance of equal payoﬀ
oﬀers (see, for example, Güth and Tietz, 1990; Güth, 1995; Güth and Kocher,
2013). In light of the generalized equity principle, this result does not come
as a surprise because, for the standard ultimatum game, all three equity rules
discussed herein suggest the same outcome: equal shares for both players.
In our experiment, we employ ﬁve diﬀerent ultimatum games between and
within subjects as our treatments. Proposer and responder bargain over a
total amount of 240 points. Treatments vary the size of the higher outside
option (either 150 or 90 points; the lower outside option is always 30 points)
and the player who has the larger outside option (i.e., the proposer or the
responder). In addition, we run a treatment where both outside options are
30 points, i.e., symmetric. Another feature of our experiment is that every
participant runs through two ultimatum games with diﬀerent outside option
constellations, which enables us to trace equity notions of one individual under
diﬀerent circumstances.
The parametrization of our treatments guarantees that (i) for the asym-
metric ultimatum games the three equity rules provide three diﬀerent point
predictions, (ii) in the symmetric game the proportional split is applicable,
2Related empirical studies use the `claims problem' (also called the `bankruptcy prob-
lem') to study equity norms in bargaining (for example, Gächter and Riedl, 2005,
2006; Bosmans and Schokkaert, 2009; for an extensive discussion, see also Gärtner and
Schokkaert, 2012). In our ultimatum games, the sum of outside options is always smaller
than the total amount available and, thus, an agreement increases eﬃciency. In the
claims problem the situation is diﬀerent because the sum of claims exceeds the available
amount.
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i.e., the outside options are diﬀerent from zero, (iii) the sum of the outside
options is smaller than the total amount available, i.e., agreement increases
eﬃciency and (iv) in some of the treatments, one outside option is larger than
the equal split.
We designed our treatments to investigate three important issues of bar-
gaining with outside options. First, we analyze whether the generalized equity
principle captures the behavior observed and, if so, which of the three equity
rules are applied under the various outside option constellations. Second, in
a within-subject comparison we investigate whether individuals consistently
apply the equity rules if they take part in two ultimatum games that diﬀer
in their outside option constellations. Finally, we study the interplay among
outside options, equity rules and rejection behavior.
One of our main ﬁndings is that the generalized equity principle proposed by
Selten (1978) reﬂects the behavior in our experiment remarkably well. Overall,
43% of observed oﬀers correspond to the point predictions of one of the three
equity rules. In the symmetric games, most proposers oﬀer the equal split. This
behavior is predicted by all three equity rules. When comparing the behavior
from the asymmetric ultimatum games across treatments, it becomes evident
that not one single equity rule is prevalent. The data suggest that a proposer
tends to apply the equity rule that beneﬁts her most.3 More precisely, the
majority of proposers opt for a proportional division when they have the larger
outside option of either 150 or 90. However, when the responder has the larger
outside option, proposers tend to suggest splitting the endowment equally. An
amount of 25% of responders' level of minimal acceptable oﬀers is captured
by the equity principle. Regarding the rejection behavior of responders, we
observe high rates of rejection in games with outside options of 150 namely,
in games in which the responder has an outside option that is larger than the
equal split. Responders, too, tend to adopt the equity rule that favors them.
This self-serving use of the equity rules by the proposers and responders often
leads to rejections, i.e., ineﬃcient bargaining outcomes. Concerning proﬁts and
eﬃciency gains, we ﬁnd that having a large outside option, i.e., 150 does not
lead to signiﬁcant improvements. This ﬁnding sheds new light on the common
3Self-serving behavior in other bargaining and negotiation contexts underlines similar ﬁnd-
ings from related work (see, for example, Messick and Sentis, 1979; Babcock et al.,
1995; Babcock and Loewenstein, 1997; Pillutla and Murnighan, 1995; Lange et al., 2010;
Rodriguez-Lara and Moreno-Garrido, 2012; Rode and Menestrel, 2011).
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understanding that better outside options are desirable.
Our review of related studies is guided by our main research questions. Do
diﬀerent equity rules explain ultimatum bargaining behavior? How do outside
options shape behavior in ultimatum games?
The application of diﬀerent distribution rules has also been investigated
in other experimental games, e.g., in the claims problem and in the dictator
game. The claims problem describes a situation where an amount of money
can be distributed between players that have claims and where the amount
to be distributed is smaller than the sum of these claims. Gächter and Riedl
(2005; 2006), Bolton and Karagozoglu (2013) and Bosmans and Schokkaert
(2009) investigated the behavior and normative judgements of individuals in a
claims problem. They show that subjects' decisions and normative judgments
are strongly inﬂuenced by proportionality considerations. Rodriguez-Lara and
Moreno-Garrido (2012) investigated the self-serving selection of justice princi-
ples in a dictator game. Prior to the distribution choice, players could enlarge
the amount to be distributed by answering trivia questions. Subjects diﬀer
in the way their (correct) answers on the quiz enlarge the amount (i.e., they
diﬀer in their productivity, which is randomly assigned). Ex ante, the authors
identify three diﬀerent division rules based on Cappelen et al. (2007): the
egalitarian, the accountability and the libertarian principle. The egalitarian
principle predicts that dictator and receiver end up with the same amount,
irrespective of their productivity. The accountability principle holds subjects
accountable for what they can control; here: the number of correct answers,
but not the productivity. A subject's share should be proportional to the
number of her correct answers. The libertarian principle does not diﬀerentiate
between what a subject can inﬂuence (the number of correct answers) and
what the subject cannot inﬂuence (the productivity). The results highlight a
self-serving bias in justice assessments. Dictators with a lower productivity
compared to the receiver tend to strive for an egalitarian distribution. Con-
trarily, when the dictator's productivity is higher than that of the receiver,
the proposals can best be described by the libertarian or the accountability
principle.
When individuals who have to distribute earnings are diﬀerent with respect
to certain characteristics their behavior seems to be guided by predictable
distribution rules. In this respect, closely related to the present work is the
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study of Kagel et al. (1996). They demonstrated that subjects try to enforce
diﬀerent seemingly `fair' allocation rules. In their ultimatum game experiment,
they manipulated the exchange rates of the experimental currency for the two
players. The players can divide the pie according to an equal dollar split or,
alternatively, according to an equal chip split. Their results eﬀectively show
that subjects with a lower exchange rate try to enforce an equal dollar split
which would make them better oﬀ compared to the equal chip split. However,
subjects who have been assigned the larger exchange rate try to adhere to
the equal chip split. The authors also observed that the disagreement over
diﬀerent distribution rules leads to frequent rejections.4
Surprisingly, although the ultimatum game is considered to be one of the
main workhorses in experimental economics (see, e.g., Güth and Kocher, 2013)
and outside options are considered to be one of the main inﬂuencing variable
in bargaining in general only a very few studies have examined the eﬀects of
asymmetric outside options within this setting (notable exceptions are Knez
and Camerer, 1995; Schmitt, 2004; Kohnz and Hennig-Schmidt, 2005; Fis-
cher, 2005; Fischer et al., 2007). Their results can be summarized as follows:
Proposers decrease their oﬀers when they have a larger outside option than
the responder but increase their oﬀers when responders have a larger outside
option. In both cases, high rates of rejection are observed, suggesting that
responders think that the oﬀers are too low. However, none of these studies
investigates how diﬀerent equity rules relate to players' behavior in asymmet-
ric ultimatum bargaining. One exception is Hennig-Schmidt et al. (2010) who
survey video experiments with asymmetric outside options in diﬀerent games
(see also Hennig-Schmidt et al., 2008). They report that subjects not only
discuss equity-based division rules, they also consider them as fair and base
their negotiation behavior on these rules.
Taken together, the modest literature so far shows that diﬀerent outside op-
tions appear to lead negotiators to disagree about what a `reasonable' division
might be. But what are underlying distribution rules in an ultimatum bar-
4Bediou et al. (2012) examine equality and equity considerations in an ultimatum game
with a prior production phase but equal outside options of zero. Without their knowledge,
subjects in their experiment solve a quiz against an algorithm which is either programmed
to win against the participant or to lose against the participant. The results indicate
that winners adhere to proportional divisions and losers tend to adhere to a more equal
distribution of the production outcome.
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gaining context with asymmetric outside options? We extend upon the above
literature and shed light on this question by systematically applying the gen-
eralized equity principle of Selten (1978) to an ultimatum bargaining context
with asymmetric outside options. The principle provides three distinct equity
rules that follow an equity logic but lead to diﬀerent distributions. Our ap-
proach deepens the understanding of how diﬀerent equity notions are at work
in ultimatum bargaining situations that might ultimately lead to ineﬃcient
bargaining outcomes.
4.1 The generalized equity principle in
ultimatum bargaining with outside options
In the following, we exemplify how the three equity rules can be derived from
applying the generalized equity principle (Selten, 1978) to bargaining with
(asymmetric) outside options. We focus on two players: i (the proposer) and
j (the responder), who negotiate about how to divide an amount a.
The generalized equity principle proposes to balance the players' shares ac-
cording to individual weights.5 Let r ≤ a be the amount of money that is to
be distributed. The non-negative weights wi and wj of players i and j reﬂect
a certain characteristic according to which the players can be compared (e.g.,
their outside options, the number of people represented by a player, a measure
of power, contributions to a joint project). Selten (1978) calls the vector of
weights (wi, wj) the standard of comparison. A standard of distribution is a
vector (ri, rj), with ri, rj ≥ 0 and ri + rj = r. The generalized equity principle
requires
ri
wi
=
rj
wj
. (4.1)
The standard of distribution for player i is given by ri = wi/(wi + wj) · r.
5When the players' allocations are based on the assumption of common rationality and
money-maximization, proposers oﬀer at least the outside option to the responder. Thus,
applying the sub-game perfect equilibrium outcome (SP) yields a share for the responder
of one unit more than her outside option. The proposer would receive the rest of the
complete amount. This result holds for the case that the amount to be distributed is
inﬁnitely divisible. Typically in experiments, bargaining units are integers. Thus, an
oﬀer of the size of the responder's outside option can also be an outcome of a sub-game
perfect equilibrium.
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Depending on the amount r and the standard of comparison wi and wj at
least three diﬀerent distribution rules can be derived for ultimatum bargain-
ing with outside options. The candidates for the amount r are the complete
amount, i.e., r = a, or the complete amount diminished by the respective
outside options, i.e., r = a − oi − oj. Natural candidates for the weights are
wi = wj = 1 (because, e.g., each bargaining party is constituted by one indi-
vidual) or wi = oi and wj = oj (since, e.g., outside options are likely to be a
major source of bargaining power).
Table 4.1: Overview of equity rules from the perspective of player i
Equity Rule r wi ri ai
Equal Split (EQ) a 1 r2
a
2
Split the Diﬀerence (SD) a− oi − oj 1 r2 oi + 12 · (a− oi − oj)
Proportional Split (PS) a oi
oi
oi+oj
· r oioi+oj · a
Notes: r is the amount to which the equity principle is applied; (ri; rj) is the standard of distri-
bution, for player i. (wi; wj) denotes the standard of comparison, ai stands for the amount the
player i receives in the case of agreement, oi represents her outside option.
Equal Split
The Equal Split (henceforth EQ) results from the generalized equity principle
when one assumes that both players have the same weight wi = wj = 1 and
that r is equal to the total amount a. According to this equity rule, every
player receives the same amount that is, ai = aj = a/2.
Split the Diﬀerence
The distribution rule Split the Diﬀerence (SD) emerges from the generalized
equity principle when r = a − oi − oj and players apply wi = wj = 1. Player
i's amount is then determined by ai = oi + 1/2 · (a− oi − oj) and player j's
amount is aj = oj + 1/2 · (a− oi − oj). SD yields an unequal distribution if
oi 6= oj. Note, that SD does not apply to the total amount to be distributed
but to the remaining pie after the outside options have been substracted.6
6Assuming that the outside options can be regarded as threat points, the distribution rule
SD also follows from the Nash bargaining solution (Nash, 1953) and the Shapley value
(Shapley, 1953). For a discussion, see Roth (1988); Chiu and Yang (1999); Anbarci and
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Proportional Split
The Proportional Split (PS) can be derived from the generalized equity prin-
ciple by using a standard of comparison based on the relative magnitude of
outside options, i.e., wi = oi and wj = oj and by assuming that r is equal
to the total amount a to be distributed. Each player's share represents her
proportional bargaining power induced by her outside option. Player i receives
ai = a · oi/(oi + oj) and player j receives aj = a · oj/(oi + oj). This equity rule
also leads to an unequal distribution if oi 6= oj.
Note that EQ, SD and PS result in the same payoﬀs if, and only if, oi = oj.
7
In the standard ultimatum game, where oi = oj, the equal split appears to be
prevalent (see Güth and Tietz, 1990; Güth, 1995).
4.2 Experiment
Experimental Design
To systematically investigate the impact of outside options on the application
of the equity principle in ultimatum bargaining, we in total investigate ﬁve
treatments, each employing an ultimatum game with diﬀerent outside option
constellations. In all treatments, the amount a to be distributed is equal to
240 points. The proposer decides on the amount she is willing to oﬀer to the
responder, while the responder simultaneously indicates the minimal oﬀer she
would be willing to accept (mao). If the proposer's oﬀer exceeds or is equal
to this minimum acceptable oﬀer, the 240 points are distributed according to
the oﬀer; otherwise, subjects receive their respective outside options. Due to
the large action space of the proposer in our experiment, eliciting responders'
behavior with the strategy method would be inconvenient. Eliciting their
behavior by asking for their mao allows us to simplify responders' decisions
and enables us to analyze their behavior in more statistical depth without
asking for every possible oﬀer.8
In the Baseline treatment, both players have the same outside option of 30
points. In addition, we employ treatments with asymmetric outside options,
Feltovich (2013).
7Note that PS is not applicable if both outside options are equal to zero.
8We are aware that employing this procedure we have to assume monotonicity in responders
behavior. Hennig-Schmidt et al. (2008) show that, at least in a German sample this
assumption can safely be made.
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where an outside option of one player is larger than the outside option of the
other player. The smaller outside option is always 30 points. We systematically
vary (i) the sizes of the larger outside option (either 150 or 90 points) and (ii)
the player who is endowed with the larger outside option (either Proposer or
Responder). Taken together, this yields ﬁve treatments: Baseline, P150, R150,
P90 and R90. An overview of all treatments and the resulting equity rules is
given in Table 4.2. Our parameterization has the unique feature to clearly
separate the distinct outcomes derived by the equity principle. In particular,
we are able to investigate their relevance when one of the outside options is
below half of the total amount of 240 (i.e., 90) or when one of the outside
options exceeds half of the total amount of 240 (i.e., 150).
In order to examine the application of equity rules between and within sub-
jects, we employ the following experimental protocol. Each subject participates
in a sequence of two diﬀerent treatments interacting with two diﬀerent coun-
terparts (perfect stranger-matching protocol) without feedback on the coun-
terpart's decision between treatments. We balance the order of the treatments
to be able to control for order eﬀects. Subjects are randomly assigned to the
role of the proposer or the responder and they maintain their roles across
treatments.9
In total, we employ twelve diﬀerent sequences of two treatments (each of
our four asymmetric treatments is combined with Baseline in both orders; in
addition, we combine the asymmetric treatments P150 with R150 and P90 with
R90 in four sequences to control for order). An overview of all sequences can
be found in Table 4.10. Technically, in each sequence, two proposers and two
responders form a matching group. Each participant interacts exactly once
with each of the two participants with the other role.
Procedural Details
Our experimental sessions involved 280 subjects from the University of Bonn
in Germany (51 % male, average age 24 years), who were recruited via the
online recruiting system ORSEE (Greiner, 2003). Each participant took part
in only one of the sessions. The experiment was programmed using the software
9We use a neutral language in the instructions and on the computer screens: Proposers are
called Player A and responders are called Player B (see the appendix for a translation
of the instructions). The original instructions were provided in German.
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Table 4.2: Treatments and predictions of equity rules
EQ SD PS
Treatment oi oj ai aj ai aj ai aj
Baseline 30 30 120 120 120 120 120 120
P150 150 30 120 120 180 60 200 40
R150 30 150 120 120 60 180 40 200
P90 90 30 120 120 150 90 180 60
R90 30 90 120 120 90 150 60 180
Notes: oi (oj) represents the outside option of the proposer (responder). ai (aj) is
the share the proposer (responder) gets as a result of the respective equity rule.
z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). Subjects' earnings were determined by summing
up earnings in both treatments in which they participated. We applied an
exchange rate of 1 point equal to 0.06e; thus, 240 points are worth 14.40e.
On average, subjects earned 15.78e. At the beginning of the experiment,
we handed out instructions and control questions to make sure that everyone
understood the general rules of the games.
4.3 Hypothesis
Our main hypothesis is based on Selten's generalized equity principle. As
shown, we can derive diﬀerent reasonable distribution rules from this princi-
ple for our treatments. Previous studies mentioned in our literature review
suggested that subjects tend to self-servingly apply diﬀerent distribution rules
depending on the respective situation (e.g., having a larger or a smaller outside
option). This leads us to our primary research hypothesis:
Hypothesis: Subjects apply the equity rules in a self-serving manner.
With respect to our experiment, we expect players with a higher outside
option to prefer either PS or SD over EQ as they yield higher payoﬀs. Players
with a lower outside option are expected to opt for an egalitarian distribution
(i.e., to prefer EQ over SD or PS).
46
Table 4.3: Average (standard deviations) oﬀers, maos, and rejection
rates pooled over all sequences
oﬀer mao rejection rate
Treatment average (s.d.) average (s.d.) average (s.d.)
Baseline 103.20 (31.72) 93.25 (38.63) .31 (.46)
P150 56.4 (27.55) 64.35 (26.31) .57 (.50)
R150 140.48 (32.37) 153.80 (23.44) .52 (.50)
P90 85.37 (31.04) 82.13 (35.38) .37 (.49)
R90 116.71 (19.41) 104.24 (23.19) .21 (.42)
Notes: s.d. = standard deviation. When analyzing average oﬀers and mao, we ﬁnd that oﬀers
(mao) are higher the larger the outside option of the responder. Analogously, oﬀers (mao) are
lower the larger the outside option of the proposer (see Table 4.10 and the regression analyses
provided in Table 4.9 in the appendix; Figure 4.2 and Figure 4.3 show distributions of decisions
for each treatment).
4.4 Results
This section is structured according to our main research question: How does
the presence of outside options inﬂuence the employment of diﬀerent equity
rules? As the generalized equity principle provides precise point predictions,
we ﬁrst focus on the number of proposers' oﬀers and responders' mao that
are in line with one of the three equity rules. Thereby we go beyond previous
studies which mainly focused on average behaviors (we display the average
oﬀers, maos and rejection rates of our treatments in Table 4.3 which conﬁrm
the ﬁndings from the literature).
In order to investigate the relevance of equity rules, we count oﬀers and
maos that can be predicted by one of the equity rules proposed by Selten. We
apply a strict point prediction classiﬁcation to categorize subjects' decisions:
We assume that a subject applies an equity rule if and only if she chooses
the exact distribution suggested by this rule. The total number of exact hits
relative to all decisions in a treatment will be denoted as the hitrate for a
speciﬁc rule.
We test our hypothesis as follows: First, we separately compare the behavior
of proposers and responders in treatments where the size of the larger outside
option is the same but the holder in one treatment is the proposer and in one
treatment is the responder. For example, we compare hitrates of a certain eq-
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uity rule in P90 and R90 for proposers and responders. As previously described,
each subject took part in two treatments with two diﬀerent outside option con-
stellations. We arranged the sequences of these treatments such that we can
compare the usage of equity rules between and within subjects. Therefore, for
each pairwise treatment comparison, we will present results from a between
and a within subjects perspective.10
Our analysis of the generalized equity principle starts with the proposers'
oﬀers followed by an assessment of responders' mao. We then discuss eﬃciency.
Oﬀers and the Generalized Equity Principle
To obtain a ﬁrst estimate how equity rules inﬂuence oﬀers, we pool all oﬀers
from all treatments and calculate the hitrate. A fraction of .43 of all oﬀers are
equitable oﬀers in line with Selten's principle.11 This number appears to be
remarkably high given our strict point prediction rule.
In Baseline, where outside options are of equal size, .51 of the subjects oﬀer
EQ. This does not come as a surprise because, as stated in section 4.1, all
three equity rules suggest the same oﬀer when outside options are symmetric.
The analysis of proposers' behavior in treatments with asymmetric outside
options leads us to our ﬁrst observation concerning the use of equity rules:
Observation 1: Proposers frequently apply the generalized equity princi-
ple. They do so in a self-serving way. Proportional splits are oﬀered more
often when proposers have the larger outside option. To the contrary, they
rely more often on equal splits when the responder has the larger outside
option.
Support for this observation can be found in Figure 4.1, which shows hitrates
for each equity rule averaged over each of the four treatments with asymmetric
10We use Fisher exact tests for the between subjects comparison and McNemar change
tests for the within subject analysis. If not mentioned otherwise, as we have formulated
a directed hypothesis, all statistical tests are carried out one-sided. As we ﬁnd no sys-
tematic evidence that oﬀers and mao are aﬀected by the respective sequence, we merge
sequences that contain the same two treatments (e.g. P150, Baseline and Baseline, P150).
A battery of 24 Mann Whitney U tests pairwise comparing the distribution of oﬀers and
mao of the same treatment between diﬀerent sequences yields no systematic signiﬁcant
diﬀerences (see Table 4.10 in the appendix).
11This ﬁgure splits up for each treatment as follows: Baseline .51, P150: .46, R150: .24, P90:
.50, R90: .37. As a comparison, the hitrate for the sub-game perfect equilibrium (SP) is
.06 (Baseline: .03, P150: .04, R150: .26, P90: .02, R90: .04) of all oﬀers.
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Figure 4.1: Oﬀer hitrate for equity rules (pooled for all sequences)
outside options. It can be seen that PS explains oﬀers particularly well, when
the proposer has the larger outside option. When the responder has the larger
outside option, EQ is most prevalent in oﬀers.
In Table 4.4, we depict the relative frequencies of exact hits for each equity
rule per treatment. The left panel shows the data for sequences that contain
one asymmetric treatment and Baseline. Comparing the hitrates between
subjects, we ﬁnd that PS is much more prevalent when proposers have the
larger outside option (p=.005 for P150 vs. R150; p=.011, for P90 vs. R90).
This tendency gets further support by a within-subject comparison. Subjects
signiﬁcantly more often oﬀer PS when they have a larger outside option of
150 (p=.001, for P150 vs. R150).
12 For EQ and SD, we observe that fractions
point into the hypothesized direction, namely EQ is more frequent when the
responder has the larger outside option whereas SD is more prevalent when the
proposer has the larger outside option. However, we ﬁnd only mild statistical
evidence comparing P150 and R150 (p=.094) for EQ.
So far, we have only focused on subjects using one of the three equity rules.
How do the other subjects react to the outside option asymmetry? To capture
the behavior of all subjects, we now go one step further and relax the strict
12Interestingly, two proposers in P150 make an oﬀer that represents a deal me out solution
(Anbarci and Feltovich, 2013), i.e., the proposer keeps her outside option (150 points)
and oﬀers the remainder to the responder (90 points). Note that this sharing rule is not
captured with the generalized equity principle.
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Table 4.4: Hitrate of equity rules
Between Subjects Within Subjects
Treatment EQ SD PS EQ SD PS
Baseline .51∗∗∗
P150 .04 .17 .29 .0
∗∗∗ .10∗∗∗ .32
<∗ <∗∗∗ >∗∗∗ >∗∗∗
R150 .21 .13 .0 .14 .0 .0
P90 .17 .08 .25 .32 .05 .13
<∗∗∗ >∗∗
R90 .33 .0 .0 .40 .0 .0
Notes: The left panel shows the hitrate of equity rules from sequences that
contained one asymmetric and one Baseline treatment. The right panel shows
the hitrate for sequences with two asymmetric treatments. Stars display
signiﬁcance levels of comparisons of two asymmetric treatments. Signiﬁcance
levels: ∗∗∗ p < .01,∗∗ p < .05, ∗ p < .1.
point prediction rule and broaden our classiﬁcation strategy. For each pro-
poser's oﬀer, we measure the absolute distance to all three equity rules. Oﬀers
are classiﬁed according to the smallest distance to one of these rules. For ex-
ample, we classify a proposer's oﬀer as EQ when, among the three distances,
the distance to EQ is the smallest. The ﬁgures support the results from our
very conservative approach, making them even stronger.13
Using this measure as a dependent variable, we estimate simple linear prob-
ability models to further verify our results of observation 1. In Table 4.5,
we predict whether a proposer oﬀers EQ, SD or PS on a treatment dummy
while controlling for the sequence of treatments. Conﬁrming the results of our
non-parametric analysis, we ﬁnd that PS in P150 and P90 is signiﬁcantly more
prevalent compared to R150 and R90, respectively.
In light of the hypothesized self-serving use of equity rules, the clear self-
serving pattern of PS choices in P150 vs. R150 and P90 vs. R90 conﬁrms our
main research hypothesis: On the one hand, from the set of our three equity
rules the PS rule yields the highest payoﬀ for the player with the higher outside
option. On the other hand, for the player with the smaller outside option, EQ
yields the highest payoﬀ, which is partially conﬁrmed by our results.
13The results of this classiﬁcation are shown in Table 4.11 in the appendix.
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Table 4.5: Predicting hitrates of equity rules
Dependent variable
EQ SD PS EQ SD PS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Independent variables
1 if P150 -0.136
∗ 0.091 0.318∗∗∗
(0.07) (0.06) (0.10)
1 if P90 -0.091 0.045 0.136
∗
(0.09) (0.05) (0.07)
Constant 0.136∗ -0.008 0.015 0.174 0.121 0.030
(0.07) (0.10) (0.19) (0.12) (0.11) (0.12)
Observations 92 92 92 92 92 92
R2 0.087 0.068 0.189 0.062 0.103 0.149
Sequence control yes yes yes yes yes yes
Notes: Linear probability models (OLS) with robust standard errors (in parentheses) clustered
on matching groups. The dependent variable EQ takes the value 1 if the oﬀer is closer to the
EQ prediction than to the prediction of the other two equity rules and 0 otherwise. Dependent
variables SD and PS are constructed analogously. Each speciﬁcation includes dummies for the
speciﬁc sequence. Reference group (Constant) for (1)-(3) R150, for (4)-(6) R90. Signiﬁcance
levels: ∗∗∗ p < .01,∗∗ p < .05, ∗ p < .1.
Thus far, we have focused on proposers' behavior in ultimatum games with
asymmetric outside options. We ﬁnd that 1) the equity principle is frequently
used and 2) it is applied self-servingly. In the subsequent paragraphs, we shed
light on responders' behavior to determine how diﬀerent equity rules inﬂuence
responders' minimum acceptable oﬀers.
Rejections and the Generalized Equity Principle
Employing again a strict point prediction rule, a fraction of .26 of all maos
can be classiﬁed as representing at least one of the three equity rules.14 This
fraction is somewhat lower than found in proposers' choices. An explanation
for this diﬀerence might be the simultaneous nature of our ultimatum game.
Responders might (strategically) anticipate proposers' equity considerations
and determine their maos such that it also represents an equitable outcome
(e.g., the lowest possible oﬀer representing an equity rule). Moreover, since
responders cannot be sure about the proposer's choice, they might be will-
ing - based on their selected mao - to make small concessions in order not to
`accidentally' reject the expected oﬀer. This especially holds if responders be-
14In comparison .2 of maos are decisions in line with the subgame perfect equilibrium (SP).
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Table 4.6: Hypothetical rejection rates for equity rules
Between Subjects Within Subjects
Treatment EQ SD PS EQ SD PS
Baseline .07∗∗∗
P150 .0 .46 .67 0 .55 .82
<∗∗∗ >∗∗∗ >∗∗∗ <∗∗∗ >∗∗∗ >∗∗∗
R150 .83 .08 .0 .82
∗∗∗ .05 .0
P90 .04 .42 .63 .0 .50 .68
>∗∗∗ >∗∗∗ >∗∗∗ >∗∗∗
R90 .13 .04 .0 .05 .0 .0
Notes: The left panel shows the rejection of equity rules from sequences
that contained one asymmetric and one Baseline treatment. The right panel
shows the results for sequences with two asymmetric treatments. Stars dis-
play signiﬁcance levels of comparisons of two asymmetric treatments. Signif-
icance levels: ∗∗∗ p < .01,∗∗ p < .05, ∗ p < .1.
lieve the proposers to exploit their bargaining power, i.e., to further minimally
lower their equity-based oﬀer. Because we count only exact hits of equity rules
such strategies might not be captured by our above percentage representing
classiﬁcations according to the equity principle.
For a more informative analysis of responders' behavior, in the following
we consider hypothetical rejection rates.15 Hypothetical rejection rates of an
equity rule in a treatment are calculated by matching the point prediction of
an equity rule with every mao made in this treatment and determining the
frequencies of rejections. The results are displayed in Table 4.6. The left
panel shows between-subject comparisons and the right panel within-subject
comparisons. Statistical tests lead to our second observation:
15We chose this procedure because it is much harder to infer a speciﬁc preference for an
equity rule from responders' maos. A simple example might highlight this: Consider a
responder in P150 who sets her mao to 40. According to our strict point prediction rule
she would be classiﬁed as PS. However, by setting this mao she does not exclude the two
other equity rules as their prediction would also be accepted with this mao. Thus, one
cannot easily categorize maos using a strict point prediction rule.
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Observation 2: Responders are more likely to reject PS and SD oﬀers
when proposers have the larger outside option. They reject EQ oﬀers more
often in R150.
Responders tend to reject PS and SD more often, when the proposer has the
larger outside option whereas EQ is rejected more often when the responder
has an outside option of 150.16
Statistical evidence is shown in Table 4.6. Responders are signiﬁcantly more
likely to reject PS and SD oﬀers when proposers have the larger outside option.
This holds for all comparisons of SD and PS for within and between-subject
comparisons (all p<.004). A rejection of EQ is more likely when the outside
option of the responder equals 150 (p<.0001). We ﬁnd no statistical evidence
that responders are more likely to reject EQ when they have an outside option
of 90.17
Pooling all data from the two treatments with the same larger outside option
in a regression analysis and controlling for the sequence of treatments conﬁrms
the results (see Table 4.7). SD and, in particular (as the coeﬃcients and the
R2 of the respective models reveal), PS oﬀers are more likely to be rejected by
responders when proposers have the larger outside option.
Eﬃciency and Proﬁts
We conclude our results section by investigating the impact of diﬀerent outside
option schemes and equity rules on eﬃciency and players' proﬁts. More specif-
ically, two questions are considered: How do outside options aﬀect eﬃciency?
Is it proﬁtable for an individual player to have a (speciﬁc) outside option?
In our setup, eﬃciency can only diﬀer across treatments due to cases of
rejection as the amount distributed in the case of agreement is 240. Because
the agreement amount always exceeds the sum of outside options, reaching an
agreement is always eﬃcient.
In our analysis, we calculate average relative eﬃciency gains and average
relative additional proﬁts. Average relative eﬃciency gains are calculated as
the absolute eﬃciency gains (i.e., the amount generated in addition to the
16Recall responder's payoﬀ would be 120 in case of accepting EQ.
17A corresponding analysis of the subgame perfect division yields that responders are more
willing to reject this distribution when they have the lower outside option.
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Table 4.7: Predicting rejections of equity rules
Dependent variable
EQ SD PS EQ SD PS
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Independent variables
1 if P150 -0.818
∗∗∗ 0.500∗∗∗ 0.818∗∗∗
(0.10) (0.10) (0.08)
1 if P90 -0.045 0.500
∗∗∗ 0.682∗∗∗
(0.05) (0.10) (0.08)
Constant 0.818∗∗∗ 0.083 -0.068 0.129 0.000 0.068
(0.10) (0.18) (0.13) (0.09) (0.20) (0.18)
Observations 92 92 92 92 92 92
R2 0.707 0.300 0.627 0.132 0.284 0.507
Sequence control yes yes yes yes yes yes
Notes: Linear probability models (OLS) with robust standard errors (in parentheses) clustered on match-
ing groups. The dependent variable EQ is 1 if the mao rejects the oﬀer predicted by EQ and 0 otherwise.
Dependent variables SD and PS are constructed analogously. Each speciﬁcation includes dummies for the
speciﬁc sequence. Reference group (Constant) for (1)-(3) R150, for (4)-(6) R90. Signiﬁcance levels: ∗∗∗
p < .01,∗∗ p < .05, ∗ p < .1.
sum of outside options) in relation to the maximally possible eﬃciency gain
(i.e., 240 minus the sum of outside options). Analogously, average relative
additional proﬁts are calculated as achieved proﬁts additional to the outside
options in relation to the maximally possible additional proﬁts (i.e., 240 minus
the players' outside option). Using these measures we account for the fact
that the possible absolute eﬃciency gains and absolute additional proﬁts diﬀer
across treatments.18
Observation 3: Average relative eﬃciency gains are lower in P150 and
R150 compared to Baseline.
The left panel of Table 4.8 shows average relative eﬃciency gains for match-
ing groups. In Baseline, the average relative eﬃciency gain is .69; however, this
measure is .42 in both P150 and R150 (p=.0088, p=.0143, Wilcoxon signed rank
test for matched pairs, henceforth WSR test, two-sided). In P90 and R90 we
observe no signiﬁcant diﬀerence in average relative eﬃciency gains compared
to Baseline.19
18For absolute values on these measures see Table 4.12.
19For this comparison, we focus on the data from sequences where matching groups went
through a sequence of Baseline and the respective asymmetric treatment.
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Table 4.8: Average relative eﬃciency gains & proﬁts
Avg. relative Avg. rel. add. proﬁts
Treatment eﬃciency gain Proposer Responder
Baseline .69∗∗∗ .31∗∗∗ -.17∗∗∗
P150 .42
∗∗∗ .05∗∗∗ -.03∗∗∗
R150 .42
∗∗∗ .09∗∗∗ -.07∗∗∗
P90 .58
∗∗∗ .24∗∗∗ -.08∗∗∗
R90 .71
∗∗∗ .29∗∗∗ -.06∗∗∗
Notes: The left panel displays average values of relative eﬃciency gains.
The right panel depicts the relative additional proﬁts realized by both
player types. Average values are based on matching group-level data and
from sequences that involve Baseline and one asymmetric treatment in
order to make appropriate non-parametric comparisons. Including data
from all sequences does not change average values substantially.
Stars display the signiﬁcance levels of a Wilcoxon signed rank test for
matched pairs comparing results from the Baseline against the respec-
tive asymmetric treatment. Signiﬁcance levels: ∗∗∗ p < .01,∗∗ p < .05,
∗ p < .1.
Observation 4: Average relative additional proﬁts are lower in P150 and
R150 compared to Baseline.
The right panel of Table 4.8 displays average relative increases in proﬁts for
both players. In Baseline, proposers (responders) realize additional proﬁts of
.31 (.17). Having an outside option of 150 induces an increase in additional
proﬁts of only .07 (-.06) for proposers (responders). Compared to Baseline,
these amounts are signiﬁcantly lower (both p<.01, WSR test). In R90 we ﬁnd
a similar tendency (.04, p=.0223, WSR test). In P90, the relative additional
proﬁts are not statistically diﬀerent from Baseline (p=.4222, WSR test).
4.5 Concluding remarks
Although outside options are a key element in many bargaining situations
investigations focusing on outside options have been relatively scarce in the
economics literature. Especially, situations in which parties have diﬀerent out-
side options lack systematic evidence which is addressed in this paper. We
provide systematic and controlled evidence that diﬀerent equity notions in
ultimatum bargaining situations with asymmetric outside options are deeply
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rooted in behavior. We ﬁnd that asymmetric outside option constellations
make it harder for bargainers to reach an agreement and extend the existing
literature by tracing diﬀerent notions of what participants consider to be suit-
able allocations based on their outside options. By employing the generalized
equity principle (Selten, 1978), we identify three diﬀerent equity rules that we
make clearly distinguishable by our experimental design. We ﬁnd clear evi-
dence that proposers' oﬀers are in line with these simple equity rules - taken all
games together, we ﬁnd that 43% of all oﬀer decisions precisely follow the gen-
eralized equity principle. The high number of proposers who try to solve the
asymmetric outside option bargaining by implementing an equitable outcome
is remarkable.
However, using our experimental design, we are also able to show that equity
rules are not applied in a consistent manner, but rather self-servingly. More
speciﬁcally, proposers are inclined to oﬀer proportional splits when these serve
their own interests. Yet, inconsistently, proposers, tend to oﬀer equal distri-
butions when responders would beneﬁt from a proportional split. At the same
time, we observe that responders are reluctant to accept proportional divisions
when they are to their disadvantage in comparison to an also feasible equal
split. Responders tend to accept proportional distributions only when they
beneﬁt them. In sum, equity rules seem to be attractive for guiding behavior
by adhering (or maybe pretending to adhere) to some equity considerations.
However, equity rules are rather chosen in a self-serving manner. This incon-
sistent application of equity rules and its conﬂict-enhancing eﬀect might well
be the reason for the low eﬃciency gains when bargainers have asymmetric
outside options.
Our results underscore and extend the general validity of models of inequity
aversion (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000). These models
rely on an understanding of what constitutes an equitable outcome. Based on
this reference point, individuals evaluate inequity which inﬂuences their utility.
However, as our study demonstrated, there is not a unique reference point
of equity but several potential candidates might be relevant. In this spirit,
models of inequity aversion can be applied to each of the three previously
discussed equity rules. We ﬁnd, that their adoption as equity rules might
indeed depend on the individual perspective and appears to be quite self-
serving. Thus, our results highlight that there might be a need to consider
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diﬀerent reference points for diﬀerent parties involved when applying models
of inequity aversion.20
Our ﬁndings also contribute to the literature on self-servingly biased be-
havior. Up to now studies on self-serving behavior were mainly able to show
that individuals demand more when they feel entitled to do so. The results
of our studies enlightens what exactly subjects think of what they consider to
be fair from diﬀerent perspectives when they are self-servingly biased, namely
proportionality or equality.
Moreover, our results conﬁrm existing doubts about a clear predominance
of one speciﬁc fairness rule which is often suggested by normative models of
distributive justice (Gärtner and Schokkaert, 2012). In our experiment, we em-
ploy outside options as a rather self-evident and exogenously provided standard
of comparison. In bargaining situations outside the laboratory, however, it is
quite often the case that a plethora of standards of comparison are available,
such as in the negotiation about the manager's compensation discussed in the
introduction. When the manager and the potential employer bargain over the
split of the proﬁt, outside options might not be the only reasonable standard of
comparison; the eﬀorts and investments of both parties might also contribute
in the future. Likewise, in a merger between two companies, the standard of
comparison for the distribution of future gains could be based on other fac-
tors than outside options, such as the pre-merger market share or the invested
amounts.
In light of our results on the self-serving usage of equity rules, one might
think that bargaining parties will strive not only for the equity rule most bene-
ﬁcial for them but rather for a standard of comparison that leads to a justiﬁable
(self-serving) distribution. Therefore, we consider our results to be at the lower
bound for self-serving behavior. The room for disagreement in bargaining po-
tentially available outside the laboratory might be larger because the standards
of comparison are likely to be less self-evident in the ﬁeld. Moreover, outside
options might not always be randomly assigned as in our experiment but could
20In this respect, our ﬁndings are in line with the literature on the `moral wiggle room' (Dana
et al., 2007), in the sense that bargaining parties have some freedom to strategically select
the `right' equity rule. It is also related to the concept of `bounded ethicality' (Chugh
et al., 2005; Bazerman and Tenbrunsel, 2011b) as subjects might actually be convinced
that their adopted equity rule is actually the `right' one while ignoring that other parties
might adopt a diﬀerent one.
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be costly to acquire. It might well be that the relevance of our three equity
rules is more pronounced if outside options are earned.
Future research needs to explore how the observed imbalances in the ap-
plication of equity rules might be mitigated by, for example, explicitly taking
the perspective of the other negotiator or investigating other procedures to
harmonize the notions of equity (Bhatt and Camerer, 2005; Costa-Gomez and
Crawford, 2006). One step into this direction might be research on why equity
rules are adopted: Are they primarily employed because of self-image concerns
(i.e., being a fair person) or because of the (maybe unwarranted) hope that the
opponent in the negotiation might be more ready to agree if an equity norm
is applied?
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4.6 Appendix
Table and Figures
Table 4.9: Estimating players' decisions
Dependent variable
oﬀer mao reject
(1) (2) (3)
Independent variables
P150 -55.81
∗∗∗ -30.45∗∗∗ 0.394∗∗∗
(6.28) (5.07) (0.12)
R150 34.02
∗∗∗ 58.92∗∗∗ 0.283∗∗
(6.53) (4.96) (0.12)
P90 -15.78
∗∗ -8.618∗ 0.128
(7.16) (5.03) (0.12)
R90 14.37
∗∗∗ 12.39∗∗∗ -0.0694
(4.95) (3.89) (0.12)
Constant 108.3∗∗∗ 93.13∗∗∗
(6.22) (3.77)
Observations 280 280 280
R2 .465 .43 .109
Sequence control yes yes yes
p-Values (Wald-test)
H0 : βP150 = βP90 .0001 .0001 .3334
H0 : βR150 = βR90 .0001 .0001 .1210
Notes: Models (1) and (2) display the results of a GLS regression
with random eﬀects. Robust standard errors are shown in parentheses.
Model (1) contains proposers' oﬀer, while model (2) contains the data
from responders. Model (3) is a probit estimation. The reference
category is Baseline (Constant). In the lower panel we display p-Values
of a Wald-test comparing the size of coeﬃcents for diﬀerent treatments
with asymmetric outside options.
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Table 4.10: Overview of sequences and results
Average oﬀer Average mao
Sequence Order of treatments Asym Baseline Asym Baseline
1st 2nd
1 P150 Baseline 50.83 <∗∗∗ 110.00 68.00 <∗∗∗ 108.25
2 Baseline P150 62.92 <∗∗∗ 115.41 54.00 <∗∗ 87.58
3 R150 Baseline 125.00 >∗∗∗ 95.00 152.08 >∗∗∗ 92.58
4 Baseline R150 146.24 >∗∗ 108.33 153.00 >∗∗∗ 100.00
5 P90 Baseline 78.00 <∗∗∗ 106.67 96.25+ < 102.75
6 Baseline P90 82.58 < 93.42 70.08 < 73.92
7 R90 Baseline 117.08 >∗∗∗ 92.50 111.67 > 99.92
8 Baseline R90 116.33 > 104.25 106.75 >∗∗∗ 81.00
Poi Roj Poi Roj
9 P150 R150 57.00 <∗∗∗ 140.92 77.50+ <∗∗∗ 154.58
10 R150 P150 54.00 <∗∗∗ 151.40 56.60 <∗∗∗ 155.90
11 P90 R90 93.33 <∗∗∗ 120.83 84.33 <∗ 99.42
12 R90 P90 88.00 <∗∗∗ 111.80 77.00 <∗ 98.10
(Pooled) Baseline 103.20 93.25
(Pooled) P150 56.40 64.35
(Pooled) R150 140.48 153.80
(Pooled) P90 85.37 82.13
(Pooled) R90 116.71 104.24
Notes: The number of subjects for every sequence except 10 and 12 is 24. In these sequences we have 20 subjects. Thus
for Baseline we have 192 subjects and 92 for each treatment with asymmetric outside options in total. Stars display
signiﬁcance levels of a Wilcoxon signed-rank test for matched pairs comparing the distribution of decisions in the same
sequence between diﬀerent treatments. Signiﬁcance levels: ∗∗∗ p < .01,∗∗ p < .05, ∗ p < .1. Plus signs display the
signiﬁcance levels of a Mann-Whitney U test comparing the distribution of decisions in the same treatment between
diﬀerent sequences. Signiﬁcance levels: + p < .1.
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Figure 4.2: Distribution of oﬀers in treatments (pooled over all sequences)
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Figure 4.3: Distribution of mao in treatments (pooled over all sequences)
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Table 4.11: Relaxed hitrate of equity rules (proposer)
Between Subjects Within Subjects
Treatment EQ SD PS EQ SD PS
Baseline 1 /∗∗∗ / / /∗∗∗ /
P150 .21 .38 .42 .27
∗ .23 .5
<∗∗∗ >∗∗∗ <∗ <∗∗ >∗∗∗
R150 .58 .42
∗∗∗ 0 .45 .55∗∗∗ 0
P90 .29 .21 .50 .36 .32 .32
∗∗∗
<∗∗∗ >∗∗∗ <∗∗∗ >∗ >∗∗∗
R90 .79 .17 0 .86 .14 0
Notes: The left panel shows the hitrate of equity rules from sequences that
contained one asymmetric and one Baseline treatment. On the right we show
the hitrate for sequences with two asymmetric treatments. For between (within)
subjects comparisons stars display the results of one-sided Fisher (McN) test.
p-Values (one-sided) in brackets. Signiﬁcance levels: ∗∗∗ p < .01,∗∗ p < .05, ∗
p < .1.
Table 4.12: Average absolute eﬃciency gains and
proﬁts
Avg. abs. Avg. abs. add. proﬁts
Treatment eﬃciency gain Proposer Responder
Baseline 123.75 95.57 66.30
P150 25.00
∗∗∗ 154.58∗∗∗ 35.33∗∗∗
R150 25.00
∗∗∗ 49.71∗∗∗ 143.54∗∗∗
P90 70.00
∗∗∗ 126.00∗∗∗ 48.58∗∗∗
R90 85.00
∗∗∗ 90.79∗∗∗ 98.42∗∗∗
Notes: The left panel displays average values of absolute eﬃciency gains.
The right panel depicts the absolute additional proﬁts realized by both
player types. Average values are based on matching group-level data and
from sequences that involve Baseline and one asymmetric treatment in
order to make appropriate non-parametric comparisons. Including data
from all sequences does not change average values substantially.
Stars display the signiﬁcance levels of a Wilcoxon signed rank test for
matched pairs comparing results from the Baseline against the respective
asymmetric treatment. Signiﬁcance levels: ∗∗∗ p < .01,∗∗ p < .05, ∗
p < .1.
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Experimental instructions (translated from German)
Welcome to the experiment!
You are participating in an economic experiment and you have the possibility to earn
a certain amount of money, which varies according to your decisions. Please read
thoroughly the following descriptions.
During the experiment we will talk about Taler and not e. Hence, your payout
will be initially calculated in Taler. The achieved total amount of money of Taler
will be converted into e at the end of the experiment and then we will give you a
cash payout, whereas
10 Taler = 0,6 e
holds true.
The decisions in the experiment
At the beginning of the experiment all participants have been randomly divided into
two groups  players in the role of A and players in the role of B  which will
interact with each other during the experiment. You will get to know neither before
nor after the experiment with whom you are interacting. At the beginning of
the experiment you will be informed of whether you are player A or B which was
determined randomly by drawing the cabin number.
The experiment is about splitting 240 Taler among player A and B. Player
A makes a proposal of how to split the 240 Taler among player A and player
B. Player B decides from which amount of money he is willing to accept the
proposal of player A. After both players have made their decisions, the decisions will
be compared.
If the proposal of allocation of player A is in the area of acceptance of player B,
then
 the 240 Taler will be split in accordance to the decisions.
If the proposal of allocation of player A is not in the area of acceptance of player
B, then
 player A and player B will each get a guaranteed amount of money, which can
be identical or diﬀerent for player A and player B. Both player A and player
B know the two guaranteed money amounts before the decisions are made.
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Every player A interacts in two diﬀerent, sequent games with two diﬀerent
players B. Every player B interacts in two diﬀerent, sequent games with two
diﬀerent players A.
If you are player A you will see this screen:
Game 1/Player A
Please note: In game 1 and game 2 you are interacting with diﬀerent players B.
Please make a proposal of how to split the 240 Taler among you and player B.
Guaranteed amount of money for yourself , in the case of a rejection of player B: 2
Guaranteed amount of money for player B, in the case of an acceptance of player B: 2
The proposed amount of money for yourself : 2
This implies: The proposed amount of money for player B: 2
The decisions of player A and player B are made simultaneously. This implies for
player B that he makes his decision before knowing which proposal player A will
actually make.
Game 1/Player B
Please note: In game 1 and game 2 you are interacting with diﬀerent players A.
Player A will make a proposal of how to split the 240 Taler among you and player A.
Please decide from which amount of money you are willing to accept the proposal of player A.
Guaranteed amount of money for player A, in the case of your rejection of the proposal: 2
Guaranteed amount of money for yourself , in the case of your acceptance of the proposal: 2
The lowest amount of money you are willing to accept: 2
This implies: The highest amount of money for player A you are willing to accept: 2
If the proposed amount of money of player A for player B is greater than or equal
to the lowest amount of money player B is willing to accept, then the proposal will
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be accepted. Vice versa the proposal of player A will be rejected, if the proposed
amount of money of player A is smaller than the lowest amount of money player B
is willing to accept.
Before the experiment starts we would like you to answer a couple of control ques-
tions. These questions will help you familiarize with the decision situation. At the
end of the experiment we would like you to answer some further questions.
In the course of the experiment any form of communication with the other
participants is forbidden. Please read now once again the instructions thoroughly
to make sure that you understood everything. If there are any uncertainties left,
please put your hand up. We will then come to you and answer your questions.
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5 The Inﬂuence of Framing and
Publicity on Moralistic
Punishment
The question of how punishment lead to adherence to social norms is central
to the social sciences. Economists usually view sanctions through the lens of
deterrence, i.e., the threat of punishment makes socially undesirable behavior
less attractive and thus fosters norm compliance (Becker, 1968). Yet, costly
punishment is only beneﬁcial to individuals who can expect future monetary
gains from it. Punishment, however, may have diﬀerent manifestations. On
the one hand, in second party punishment (or peer-to-peer punishment) where
victims of norm deviance can discipline norm violators in order to extract fu-
ture gains from them. For example, when cooperators in repeated prisoners
dilemmas punish defectors in order to convince them to cooperate in the sub-
sequent periods (Fehr and Gächter, 2000). On the other hand, in third-party
altruistic punishment or moralistic punishment where observers of norm viola-
tions, who are not monetarily aﬀected, can punish violators without expecting
future rewards from them.1
A stream of studies has investigated the borderline conditions for peer-to-
peer punishment to enhance cooperation (e.g., Gächter et al., 2008; Gürerk
et al., 2006), trust (e.g., Fehr and Gächter, 2002; Fehr and Rockenbach, 2003),
and fairness (e.g., Hoﬀman et al., 1994) in strategic interactions.2 In contrast
to this literature on peer-to-peer punishment it pertains to be a yet unresolved
question when and why also not aﬀected individuals punish (e.g., Lergetporer
1Other researchers call it third-party punishment (Lergetporer et al., 2014), altruistic pun-
ishment (Fehr and Gächter, 2002) or moralistic punishment (Kurzban et al., 2007). Since
there seems to be no consensus on the use of one of these terms, we will stick to the term
moralistic punishment throughout the paper.
2See also Chaudhuri (2011) for an excellent review of how second-party punishment inﬂu-
ences cooperation.
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et al., 2014; Carpenter and Matthews, 2012) the violation of norms.3
In this paper, we use a simple experiment to address two questions regarding
moralistic punishment of unfair behavior. The ﬁrst question pertains to the
framing of norm violations. Will the framing of unfair behavior, as either not
giving money to or taking money from - although the monetary consequences
are the same - a helpless victim aﬀect moralistic punishment? There is ample
evidence that framing inﬂuences behavior in simple lottery choices (e.g., Kah-
neman and Tversky, 1979). How framing determines punishment behavior in
strategic interactions is still not well understood.4
Our second research question seeks to illuminate whether publicity impacts
moralistic punishment. We try to shed light on whether third parties pun-
ish diﬀerently depending on whether the victim of unfair behavior is informed
about the punishment of the third-party or not. Will their behavior be aﬀected
when her action is made public to the victim, i.e., in a situation where the re-
cipient is informed about the action compared to a situation where the action
remains private and the recipient is not informed. A growing research stream
in economics explores the eﬀects of social and self-image concerns for decision
making (Andreoni and Bernheim, 2009; Lacetera and Macis, 2010; Friederich-
sen and Engelmann, 2014). In our case, an observer who punishes when the
victim will be informed about his action has at least two motives for punishing
the dictator. For example, to restore justice, i.e., and equalize the ﬁnal payoﬀs,
but also to appear in good light towards the victim, i.e., receive publicity. We
argue that publicity is a main driver of moralistic punishment and hypothesize
that punishment will diminish when the victim is not informed about others
punishment action.
We study these questions using a controlled laboratory experiment that em-
ploys a modiﬁed version of the dictator game with moralistic punishment (Fehr
and Fischbacher, 2004). The dictator can decide upon a payoﬀ distribution
between herself and an inactive recipient. A third-party - the observer - sees
the dictator's actions and can reduce the dictator's payoﬀ at her own expense.
3Interestingly, while third-party punishment in humans seems to be a robust phenomenon,
the evidence of third-party sanctioning behavior among other species, i.e. chimpanzees,
seems to be mixed (Von Rohr et al., 2012; Riedl et al., 2012).
4In fact, there is now a growing number of papers on framing in public goods games (e.g.
McCusker and Carnevale, 1995; Andreoni, 1995; Cubitt et al., 2011; Dufwenberg et al.,
2011; Tan and Xiao, 2014). Evidence on how contributions are aﬀected by framing is
inconclusive (Goerg and Walkowitz, 2010; Gächter et al., 2014).
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To investigate the research questions regarding moralistic punishment we em-
ploy a 2x2 design. A dictator could either give a certain amount from his
endowment of 100 talers to the recipient or take a certain amount from the
recipients' endowment of 100 talers (Give vs. Take). The information about
the observer's punishment decision is either shared with the recipient or not
(Public vs. Private). The parametrization of our experiment allows us to
compare moralistic punishment behavior in strategically equivalent situations.
Moreover, the experimental approach has the advantage that we have strict
control over who will be informed about the punishment choice, which is very
hard to ensure in situations outside the laboratory. Our main variable of
interest is the observers punishment decision. In addition, we are able to in-
vestigate whether dictators anticipate their punishment and behave diﬀerently
depending on framing and publicity.
Although standard economic theory and theories of social preferences would
predict no diﬀerences in punishment and dictator behavior across treatments,
we ﬁnd remarkable diﬀerences in our experiment. The main ﬁnding of this
paper is that observers punish more when dicator's action is framed as giving
compared to when her action is framed as taking. When recipients will not
be informed about the punishment choice, i.e., observers cannot take credit
for their moral act, no such framing eﬀect can be observed. Moreover, we ﬁnd
that dictators seem to anticipate these eﬀects and behave more generously and
by this deﬂect punishment when the punishment decision is made public.
Our study contributes to the understanding of moralistic punishment, fram-
ing and publicity in two ways. First, to the best of our knowledge no study
of framing eﬀects on moralistic punishment in dictator games has been con-
ducted. Although, framing seem to be relevant for individual decisions under
risk, the relationship of punishment and framing is not well understood. The
existing studies on framing social dilemmas has led to rather inconclusive re-
sults. Compared to a social dilemma our experimental paradigm is simple
and might thus lead to a better understanding when and why framing aﬀects
behavior.
Second, our study contributes to the understanding of social image concerns.
We show that when bystanders will not receive credit by victims of norm vio-
lations, their willingness to engage in ethical behavior diminishes. In contrast
to the existing literature on social image concerns our paper points into the
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direction that these concerns might stem from whether individual can receive
credit from those they helped.
We will start by discussing the existing results on moralistic punishment and
framing and then describe the papers on publicity. After this literature review
in Section 5.1. we describe our experimental design and hypotheses in Section
5.2. In Section 5.3 we report the results. In Section 5.5 we discuss potential
applications and conclude.
5.1 Related literature
Our review of papers is structured around our research questions. We will ﬁrst
present papers that demonstrate how framing might inﬂuences behavior in the
modiﬁed dictator game employed in the present study. Then we will discuss
experiments dealing with publicity concerns.
Moralistic punishment as such seems to be an increasingly recognized topic
in the economics domain. First, a stream of previous studies have shown
the existence and investigated its motives. Bernhard et al. (2006). Fehr and
Fischbacher (2004) use an experimental design that is similar to our set-up.
Interestingly, they ﬁnd that roughly 60% of observers are willing to punish dic-
tators for very low amounts of dictator giving. The same paradigm has been
used by Almenberg et al. (2011). In addition, the authors give observers the
possibility to reward dictators for good behavior. They report altruistic pun-
ishment for low giving rates but also see a considerable fraction of observers
rewarding generous dictators.5 All of their treatments contain a dictator game
in which dictators actions are framed as giving.6 Moralistic punishment of
decisions on taking is studied in the baseline treatment of Balafoutas et al.
(2013). In their experiment, the dictator and the recipient are given unequal
endowments, whereby the recipient has a higher endowment than the dicta-
tor. The dictator can then decide to take something from the recipient's
5In a comparable attempt, Chavez and Bicchieri (2013) analyze third-party sanctioning
and rewarding behavior in an ultimatum game and come up with similar conclusions:
Third-parties, after having observed unfair results of an ultimatum game, punish unfair
proposers and compensate unfairly treated responders.
6To study the eﬀects of willful ignorance on third party punishment, Bartling et al. (2014)
also use a modiﬁed version of the dictator game. In their experiment, the dictator is
instructed to decide how many points will be credited to himself and (p. 34) the
recipient. Punishment levels are comparable to the studies by Fehr and colleagues.
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endowment. An observer is able to punish the dictator. Although parame-
ters, framing and endowments are very diﬀerent from the studies discussed
above, it is noteworthy that in Balafoutas et al. (2013) also roughly 50% of
observers punish dictators for taking money from the recipient. This means
that although the vast majority of papers on moralistic punishment in dic-
tator games framed as giving proof the existence of moralistic punishment,
punishment for taking also occurs. It lacks, however, a systematic analysis
which the present study aims to provide.7
How the presence of others and their observation of behavior inﬂuences in-
dividuals has been the subject of studies in the social-psychology literature.
It has been shown that individuals have a general tendency to act more pro-
social if others observe their behavior (e.g., Latane, 1970). In an economic
laboratory experiment, Hoﬀman et al. (1994) show that in dictator games al-
most no money is allocated to the recipient if the experimenter never learns
how much they allocate to the recipient. By varying the observability of dicta-
tors actions, Schram and Charness (2011) try to distinguish moral from social
norms. In their experiment, they vary what other participants in the exper-
iment know about a dictator's action. After the experiment is ﬁnished, the
dictator's payoﬀ was displayed on every participants' computer screen. Addi-
tionally, the dictator had to walk through the laboratory to pick up the money.
This was contrasted with a treatment in which dictators' payoﬀs were private
and anonymous. Schram and Charness ﬁnd that, when payoﬀs are made pub-
lic, dictators are much more generous compared to a situation where payoﬀs
are private.
How the observability of one's punishment choice inﬂuences punishment is
not well established. One notable exception is the paper by Kurzban et al.
7Although no study investigates the eﬀect of framing on moralistic punishment, there have
been attempts to investigate the eﬀects of framing on dictator behavior. For example,
across three studies, Dreber et al. (2013) ﬁnd no eﬀect of framing on dictator behavior.
The authors vary not only the diﬀerent labeling of dictators strategies (give vs. take)
but also labeling of games (Giving game vs. Taking game). Even with a remarkably
high number of observations, they do not ﬁnd any statistically signiﬁcant framing eﬀect
on dictators' behavior.
In seminal papers, List (2007); Bardsley (2008) expand the action set of dictators
in that dictators could also take money from the recipient. He shows that generosity
decreases if dictators are given the opportunity to take money from the recipient. Al-
though these studies seem related to the present approach is diﬀerent, because we keep
the dictators action set constant and solely vary framing of actions.
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(2007), in which the authors let third-parties observe free-riding behavior in
a two player prisoners dilemma game (Study 2), i.e., one subject chooses to
cooperate while the other subject defects. Third-parties then could decide to
reduce the payoﬀ of a selﬁsh individual at their own cost. The researchers vary
the degree of observability of punishment in three treatments with the following
method. In one treatment, they assured the subjects that the researchers were
not able to follow their individual choices. Third-parties were endowed with
money that they could spend on punishing the defector. Subjects were given
two envelopes. For one envelope subjects were instructed to put in the money
they wanted to keep, while for the other envelope they were supposed to put in
the money they wanted to spend on punishment. These envelopes were then
sealed. When subjects left the room, they came across a bin where they were
instructed to deposit their envelope with all other participants' envelopes. This
procedure ensured that the experimenter was not able to link the punishment
choice to a subject's identity. In a second treatment, researchers increased the
observability by letting subjects tell the experimenter their punishment choice.
In the third treatment, subjects had to state their punishment choice in front
of all other participants in the experiment. The main result is that punishment
levels increase as the audience is widened.8
5.2 Experimental design
Treatments
The impact of framing and publicity on moralistic punishment is investigated
by means of a modiﬁed version of the dictator game. Three players are in-
volved: a dictator, an observer and a recipient.9 The game has three stages.
In the ﬁrst stage of the game, the dictator chooses a certain amount of taler
the recipient will earn in the end. In the second stage the observer can reduce
the dictators payoﬀ. A reduction of the dictators payoﬀ is costly to the ob-
server and deducted from the endowment. A reduction of three talers of the
dictators payoﬀ lowers the initial endowment of the observer by one taler etc.
8Interestingly, Xiao and Houser (2011) show that in a multi-period public goods game, pun-
ishment has no positive impact on cooperation when others cannot see the punishment
choices.
9To avoid any eﬀects from these role descriptions in the experiment the diﬀerent roles are
called player A (dictator), player B (observer) and player C (recipient).
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In the third stage players receive their payoﬀs and information regarding the
behavior of others.
We employ the following 2 (Give vs. Take) x 2 (Public vs. Private) factorial
design. In the ﬁrst dimension we vary how the decision of the dictator is
framed. In the treatments with Give frame the game is presented in the
following way: The dictator is endowed with 100 taler, and the recipient has
an endowment of 0 taler. The dictator in the Give frame can then decide to
give 0, 20 or 50 talers to the recipient. In the Take frame, the dictator has 0
taler as an endowment, while the recipient has 100 taler as an endowment. The
dictator in the Take frame can then decide to take 100, 80 or 50 taler from the
recipients endowment.10 In all four treatments the observer has an endowment
of 50 taler. The treatments vary the representation of the dictators' action but
are strategically equivalent. For a dictator's strategy, the recipient's payoﬀ is
either 0, 20 or 50 taler, respectively.
In the second dimension we vary whether the recipient is informed about
the punishment choice of the observer. In the Public treatment it is known to
all players that the recipient will be informed about whether the observer has
punished the dictator or not and also about the amount of assigned punish-
ment. In the Private treatments this information is not given to the recipient.
The information conditions are explicitly stated in the instructions and on the
decisions screen before subjects make their choices in the experiment. When
subjects made their choices a questionnaire on their beliefs about the other
participants behavior followed. Belief elicitation was not incentivized.
Procedural details
All treatments have important features in common. In every treatment, all
players receive a show-up fee of 2.50e, which is not part of the subject's en-
dowment. In the instructions and on the decision screens, we avoid terms like
punishment or sanction to describe the observers' action and instead refer
to a deduction that changes the dictators payoﬀs. To make sure that the
10The original instructions were in German. For these we used either the term geben for the
Give frame or nehmen for the Take frame. We restrict the choice set of the dictator for
two reasons. Previous studies on dictator games observed that dictators can be classiﬁed
principally in three diﬀerent types: Completely selﬁsh dictators, slightly selﬁsh dictators
and dictators that share the endowment equally. We rule out the possibility of transfers
that exceed 50% of the endowment, because there is ample evidence that only a very
small fraction of dictators gives more than that (Engel, 2011).
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rules of the game have been understood, before starting the experiment, ev-
ery subject had to answer three control questions on the experiment correctly.
Moreover, subjects were never informed about the other subjects' identities
and they interacted anonymously. Each subject participated in the experiment
only once, i.e, the games were played one-shot. The study was conducted with
the experimental computer software z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). For observers'
punishment decisions, we implemented the strategy method (Selten, 1967) at
the second stage: Observers indicated for all three strategies of the dictator
the amount (in taler) by which she wants to reduce the dictators payoﬀs. This
means that the observer had to decide before actually knowing the dictator's
choice. This procedure has the advantage of gathering the complete action set
of the observer. For example, if all dictators in our experiment chose the same
recipients payoﬀ we would lose the data on the observers' behavior for all other
strategies.11
The experiment was conducted in June 2014 in the Cologne Laboratory of
Experimental Research (CLER) with 276 (mean age=23.7 (SD=5.24); 63%
female) participants majoring in diﬀerent disciplines. In total, we conducted
11 sessions. Participants were invited using the online recruitment system
ORSEE (Greiner, 2003). The experiment was followed by a post-experiment
questionnaire. Earned talers were converted to Euro at the end of the ex-
periment at a conversion rate of 10 taler to 1 Euro. The experiment took
approximately one hour and participants earned on average 6.88e(minimum
2.50e, maximum 12.50e), including the show-up fee.
Theoretical considerations and behavioral hypotheses
on framing and publicity
Although the goal of this paper is not to diﬀerentiate between competing
economic theories, it is worth discussing some existing models and their pre-
dictions with regard to altruistic punishment.
Neither the standard economic model of narrow self-interest nor models of
social preferences predict any diﬀerences in punishment between treatments. In
fact, if we assume a solely self-interested observer, we would expect to observe
11Obviously, we are not able to discard objections that the strategy method might inﬂuence
behavior in our experiment. However, a survey by Brandts and Charness (2011) demon-
strates that the likelihood that the strategy method inﬂuences behavior in economic
experiments is rather small.
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no moralistic punishment due to its cost. Similar minded dictators would give
nothing (in Give) and take everything (in Take), respectively. Moreover, only
some models of social preferences are able to predict positive punishment rates,
but these are silent about potential eﬀects of framing or publicity.12 As our
null hypothesis we state:
Hypothesis 1: Moralistic punishment is not inﬂuenced by framing
and publicity.
Research in experimental economics and social psychology, however, has
shown that the representation of a decision has an impact on the ﬁnal de-
cisions. Besides the standard economic approach, framing eﬀects are usually
explained with prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979), which assumes
that individuals evaluate a decision problem relative to a reference point. Out-
comes below the reference point are perceived as losses, while outcomes above
the reference point are perceived as gains. According to prospect theory, in-
dividuals experience a larger disutility from a loss and engage in more risk
loving compared to the utility derived from a gain of the same magnitude
and consequently engage in risk averse behavior. These eﬀects of framing on
behavior in individual lottery choices are well established. In strategic interac-
tions, such as the dictator game with altruistic punishment, it is not clear what
prospect theory would predict. Although past research has shown that sub-
jects carry a preference for the payoﬀ of others (e.g. Fehr and Schmidt, 1999;
Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000) it is unclear whether observers take the losses
of others more into account than similar sized gains of others. Second, it is
12In the Fehr and Schmidt (1999) model (FS) an observer's utility is positively inﬂuenced
by his own payoﬀ but can be negatively inﬂuenced if payoﬀs of other actors are larger
(disadvantageous inequality), and if payoﬀs of other actors are smaller (advantageous
inequality). Empirically, the authors ﬁnd that usually the former inequality leads to
larger utility losses. Under certain parameter constellations, it is straightforward to show
that observers might reduce a dictator's payoﬀ in order to minimize disadvantageous
inequality towards the dictator. The Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) model assumes that
observer's utility is inﬂuenced by his own material payoﬀ and the own relative share of
the total payoﬀs. If the observer's payoﬀ is lower than the relative share she experiences
a disutility. Irrespective of what the dictator leaves for the recipient in our setup the
initial share of the observer is always 1/3 (50 is endowment of the observer / 150 is
the sum of all endowments). Thus, assuming this type of preferences we would not
expect any punishment to occur. In addition, models of pure reciprocity (Dufwenberg
and Kirchsteiger, 2004; Rabin, 1993) (which assume that observers punishment choice
is driven by negative intention) do not predict any altruistic punishment because the
dictator's action is not aﬀecting the observer directly.
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unclear what the reference point is.13 One natural candidate for a reference
point in the present experiment would be the status-quo, i.e., the endowments
given to our participants. In that case, for example, taking 100 taler from the
recipient might be perceived as more blameworthy than giving 0 taler. For
this to occur, however, one has to additionally assume that 1) observers take
the changes in payoﬀs of recipients and dictators into account, i.e., they have
social-preferences, and 2) that observers perceive the losses of recipients more
negatively than similarly-sized gains. In the social psychology literature there
is a discussion on how acts of commission are perceived diﬀerently compared
to acts of omissions. One main result from this research is that harmful acts
of commission are judged as more immoral than harmful omissions (Spranca
et al., 1991). With respect to our experiment, assuming that giving 0 taler is
considered as an omission and taking 100 taler is a commission this reasoning
would lead to similar predictions.
Hypothesis 2 (Framing): In the Take treatments we observe more
moralistic punishment than in the Give treatments.
Eﬀects of publicity on pro-social behavior are usually explained with signal-
ing models (Bénabou and Tirole, 2002; Andreoni and Bernheim, 2009; Gross-
man and van der Weele, 2013).14 Numerous studies show that individuals
behave more pro-socially if their actions are made public (see also Schram
and Charness, 2011; Charness et al., 2007). In a meta study, Engel (2011)
documents that dictators allocate money more equally when their identity is
disclosed ex-post.15 Two factors make the study at hand qualitatively diﬀer-
ent from the existing research. First, our study deals with costly punishment
and sanctioning behavior and not with pro-social behavior. Second, in most
of these studies dictators announced their decision in front of a group of par-
ticipants including recipients and other dictators. Several factors, such as
13In fact, there is a lively debate on what constitutes the reference point in decisions under
risk, while some scholars argue that the status-quo might be one candidate others assume
that individuals expectations can also represent a reference point (K®szegi and Rabin,
2006).
14Social psychologists usually refer to this behavior and motivation as self-representation
or self-image (see, for example, Kurzban and Aktipis, 2006).
15Even when dictators just have the feeling of being observed their pro-sociality altered.
Nettle et al. (2013) review studies on dictator game giving when subjects have the feeling
of being observed during their decision-making. A majority of studies show that dictators
give more when they have the feeling of being observed.
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group-pressure or norm conformity, may have led to the observed diﬀerences
in behavior. Thus, prima facie, it is unclear whether observed pro-sociality
might be due to signaling pro-social behavior to recipients or conforming to
a social norm of other dictators. In our experiment the diﬀerences between
Public and Private are more clearly deﬁned. The only variable that changes
between the treatments is whether the person aﬀected by a a norm violation
is informed or not, while the dictator is always informed. We hypothesize that
the positive eﬀect of publicity on pro-social behavior is mainly driven by the
fact that victims or beneﬁciaries of ones action see it. Thus, we come to our
third hypothesis on moralistic punishment:
Hypothesis 3 (Publicity): In the Public treatments we observe more
moralistic punishment than in the Private treatments.
5.3 Results
The presentation of our results starts with an analysis of observers' punishment
decisions and is followed by a closer look into recipients' expectations about
punishment and will end with an analysis of dictators' behavior.
Since we elicited observers punishment decision with the strategy method
we start our analysis by taking the average amount of punishment for all three
dictators choices for each observer. The results of this calculation can be found
in Table 5.1. We see that observers reduce dictators payoﬀs on average by 18.52
taler in the Give-Public treatment compared to only 9.48 taler in the Take-
Public treatment (Mann-Whitney U test henceforth MWU test, p=.0136).16
In the Private treatments, we do not ﬁnd a similar eﬀect of framing. In Give-
Private dictators payoﬀs are reduced by 8.78 taler compared to 11.13 in Take-
Private (p=.3762, MWU test). In Give-Private, the punishment by observers
is signiﬁcantly lower compared to the Give-Public treatment (p=.0292, MWU
test). We ﬁnd no signiﬁcant diﬀerence when comparing Take-Private and
Take-Public (p=.2466, MWU test).
After having compared the average levels of punishment we now focus in
more detail on the punishment assigned for each dictators action. In Figure
16If not mentioned otherwise for all non-parametric statistical comparisons we report one-
sided p-Values.
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Table 5.1: Average received punishment
Average received punishment (in taler)
Treatment Public Private Framing (pooled)
Give 18.52 (1.3) >∗∗ 8.78 (.87) 13.65 (1.09)
∨∗∗(††) ∧ ∨(∗∗∗)
Take 9.48 (.65) < 11.13 (1.1) 10.3 (.89)
Publicity (pooled) 14 (.98) > 9.96 (1) 11.98
Notes: Average punishment (left panel) and recipients payoﬀ across treatments. In brackets we
display the average number of instances (between 0 to 3) of observers punish. Stars (Crosses) display
signiﬁcance levels of a one-sided Mann-Whitney U test (χ2-test). ∗∗∗(†††) Signiﬁcance at p<.01,
∗∗(††) Signiﬁcance at p<.05, ∗(†) Signiﬁcance at p<.1.
5.1 we show the average level of observers' punishment, i.e., for each recipient's
payoﬀ the amount deducted from the dictator's payoﬀ. In the left panel we
depict the data for the Public treatments, while in the right panel one can ﬁnd
the results from the Private treatments; dashed lines show the Give frame,
and solid lines the Take frame. We see that moralistic punishment decreases
in the payoﬀ of the recipient.17
We ﬁnd that the stated diﬀerences from above mainly result from diﬀerences
in punishment levels for the most selﬁsh action of the dictator, i.e., whether
she gives nothing or takes everything. Observers reduce dictators payoﬀs on
average by 35.35 taler in Give-Public compared to only 17.48 taler in Take-
Public, when dictators leave nothing for the recipient (p=.0117, MWU test).
In the Private treatments, observers reduce dictators payment by 16.69 taler
under the Give frame, and 18.39 taler under the Take frame when recipients
receive nothing (p=.3886, MWU test). In fact, observers seem to signiﬁcantly
reduce their punishment in Give-Private compared to Give-Public (p=.0163,
MWU test). No such diﬀerence is observed in the Take treatments (p=.267,
MWU test).18
17Coeﬃcients of GLS regressions with robust standard errors clustering on the individual
level explaining punishment with recipients payoﬀ (and a constant) separately for each
treatment are all negative and highly signiﬁcant with at least -.27 magnitude. Thus,
if the dictator behaves more generously, i.e., the recipient's payoﬀ increases, moralistic
punishment decreases.
18An analysis for the other transfer levels can be found in Table 5.4 in the appendix.
Further regression analyzes controlling for gender, study major and age in Table 5.5
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Figure 5.1: Average amount of received punishment
In addition to the amount of punishment, we are able to analyze how often
observers punish. We do this by counting for every observer the instances in
which observers choose to punish the dictator for the three possible cases. We
display these average ﬁgures in brackets of the of Table 5.1. The statistical
analysis reveals that observers punish the dictator on average 1.3 times Give-
Public. This constitutes a statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerence compared Take-
Public (.65%) (p=.036, χ2-test). Hence, we state our ﬁrst observation:
Observation 1: Observers punish dictators more and more severely
when dictators behave selﬁshly in Give compared to Take. When recip-
ients are not informed, in Private, about punishment, no such framing
eﬀect is observed.
Surprisingly, this partially contradicts our initial hypothesis that losses of
others weigh more than equal-sized gains of others and thus lead to more
punishment. More evidence on this rather surprising punishment pattern
comes from the analysis of recipients expectations about observers' punish-
ment. When observers and dictators make their choices we elicit recipients'
expectations by asking them for every dictators action how much the observer
in the appendix conﬁrm this observations.
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Figure 5.2: Relative frequencies of punishers (black bars) among observers and
expected number of punishers (gray bars) for the most selﬁsh action
of the dictator among recipients.
would punish. The analysis of their expectations might be especially insightful,
because recipients cannot decide in the dictator game. Thus, their expectations
are not confounded with prior decisions. In Figure 2, the relative frequency of
recipients who think that observers will punish the dictator for the setting the
recipients payoﬀ to zero (gray bars) is depicted.19
For comparability reasons we display the actual number of observers who
punish in black bars.20 First, we observe that recipients anticipate the treat-
ment eﬀects reported above: Recipients expect that more observers punish
under the Give than under the Take frame, when punishment will be made
public (p=.039, χ2-test). This is not the case when comparing recipients' ex-
pectations between Give and Take frame in the Private treatments (p=.465,
19For this analysis we focus on the expectations for the lowest recipients' payoﬀ because the
analysis of actual punishment behavior showed that our treatment diﬀerences are mainly
driven by the diﬀerence in the lowest recipients payoﬀ. We calculate this frequencies by
counting the number of recipients that expect the observer to exert a positive punishment
level. An analysis of recipients' expectations for the other payoﬀs can be found in Table
5.4 in the appendix.
20In a comparable experiment by Fehr and Fischbacher (2004) At each transfer level below
50 (taler) roughly 60% (n=22) of players C [observers] choose to punish the dictator
(p.68). It should be noted, that their experiment is only comparable to our Give-Public
treatment.
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χ2-test). Second, recipients' expectations and observers' punishment choices
are not statistically diﬀerent in the Public treatments (Give: p=.753, Take:
p=.753, χ2-test), whereas recipients expect that more observer will punish in
the Private treatment (Give: p=.077, Take, p=.458, χ2-test). It seems that
recipients correctly anticipate the eﬀect of framing on punishment, , but tend
to slightly overestimate observers' likelihood to punish in Give-Private. 21
Observation 2: Recipients expect observers to punish more in Give
than in Take.
Although it is not the main focus of this paper, we also provide evidence
of how dictators' behavior might be aﬀected by framing and publicity. Do
dictators anticipate the observed punishment patterns and try to circumvent
punishment by being more generous? Table 5.2 shows dictators behavior, i.e.,
the average payoﬀ she left for the recipient in our experiment. A look at
the Table 5.2 shows that recipient's payoﬀs tend to be higher in the Public
treatments compared to the Private treatments. When punishment is public,
recipient's payoﬀs in the Give (Take) frame are on average 19.13 (23.91) talers
whereas when punishment remains private, recipients in Give (Take) receive
12.61 (6.96) talers on average. A statistical analysis, however, reveals that this
tendency is only signiﬁcant for a comparison between Take-Private and Take-
Public (p=.019, χ2-test). A corresponding analysis for the Give frame yields
no statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerence (p=.312, χ2-test).22 A supplementary
regression analysis in Table 5.6 in the appendix, where we control for other
observables (Sex, Age and Major), conﬁrms this observation.
Observation 3: Dictators behave more generous in Public than in
Private.
Our ﬁnal observation is made by a comparison of average total payoﬀs, i.e., a
measure for eﬃciency realized by every three player group. For every dictator-
21An analysis of dictators expectations, although they are confounded by their own prior
decisions, tend to underline this observation but remain insigniﬁcant. For the most selﬁsh
action in Public more dicators think that observers will punish in Give (.70) than in Take
(.65) (p=.753, χ2-test). When punishment is Private in Give a fraction of .61 thinks
observers will punish, whilst this ﬁgure is .52 for Take (p=.552, χ2-test).
22If we pool the data from Give and Take treatments we ﬁnd, however, that payoﬀs for
recipients are signiﬁcantly higher in the Public than in the Private treatments (p=.008,
χ2-test)
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Table 5.2: Average recipients payoﬀs
Average recipients payoﬀs (in taler)
Treatment Public Private Framing (pooled)
Give 19.13 > 12.61 15.87
∧† ∨†† ∨†††
Take 23.91 <†† 6.96 15.43
Publicity (pooled) 21.52 >††† 9.78 15.65
Notes: Crosses display signiﬁcance levels of a one-sided χ2-test.
††† Signiﬁcance at p<.01, †† Signiﬁcance at p<.05, † Signiﬁcance at p<.1.
observer-recipient group we sum up the payoﬀs (in taler) that they received at
the end of the experiment (excluding the show-up fee of 2.5ewhich has been
paid out to every participant). If no punishment would have been exerted the
highest total payoﬀ of a group would have been 150. A reduction of one taler
of dictators payoﬀ, however, reduces the total payoﬀ by 4/3 taler.
As the observations from above and the corresponding ﬁgures from Table 5.3
suggest on average the maximally eﬃcient outcome is not reached. In fact, four
Wilcoxon signed rank tests testing the average total payoﬀ against 150 conﬁrm
that the average total payoﬀ in every treatment is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from
the maximally reachable level (Give-Public: p=.0011, Give-Private: p=.0018,
Take-Public: p=.0257, Take-Private: p=.0029).
Considering eﬃciency for each treatment shows that the highest level of
eﬃciency is reached in Take-Public. Here average total payoﬀs are by 14 talers
higher compared to Give-Public (p=.0809, MWU test, two-sided). A similar
comparison for the Private treatments tend to go in the same direction but
remains insigniﬁcant (p=.8439, two-sided).
Observation 4: Average total payoﬀs tend to be higher in Take treat-
ments compared to the Give treatments.
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Table 5.3: Average total payoﬀs
Average total payoﬀs (in taler)
Treatment Public Private Framing (pooled)
Give 124.96 < 129.83 127.39
∧∗ ∧ ∧
Take 138.69 > 132.45 135.57
Publicity (pooled) 131.83 > 131.13 131.48
Notes: Stars display signiﬁcance levels of a two-sided MWU test. ∗∗∗ Signiﬁcance at
p<.01, ∗∗ Signiﬁcance at p<.05, ∗ Signiﬁcance at p<.1.
5.4 Discussion and concluding remarks
This paper provides evidence that framing of unfair behavior and publicity
of punishment aﬀects individuals' propensity to punish unfairness. We set up
a modiﬁed version of the dictator game with moralistic punishment, in which
observers do not have and cannot expect any material beneﬁt from disciplining
unfair dictators.
We ﬁnd that they are more likely to punish selﬁsh behavior in the treat-
ment where dictators give nothing, compared the treatment where dictators
take everything, although both actions lead to similar payoﬀ consequences for
the victim of unfair behavior. Additionally, we provide evidence that punish-
ment decreases substantially when recipients will not be informed about the
observers punishment choice.
In line with existing studies, we ﬁnd that a large fraction of observers is
willing to punish unfair dictators. However, as reviewed in the beginning,
most studies employing this paradigm considered a dictator game solely under
a give-frame and a scenario where the recipient is informed about the ob-
server's punishment choice of the observer. When transforming the game in a
take-frame, keeping the consequences of dictators actions constant, and vary
the information the recipient receives the prevalence of moralistic punishment
changes drastically. While the eﬀects of publicity on moralistic punishment
conﬁrm evidence from the existing literature the eﬀect of framing seems rather
surprising. What are potential reasons for the observed eﬀects of framing on
punishment? Why is taking large amounts from the recipient punished less
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compared to giving low amounts to the recipient, although it leads to the
same payoﬀ consequences?
One explanation might result from the distribution of initial endowment,s
that changes across the framing conditions. In the Give treatment each dicta-
tor has 100 talers and the recipient has 0 talers; while it is exactly the opposite
in the Take treatment. In the Give treatment, observers may perceive the dic-
tator as a relatively wealthy individual who behaves selﬁsh versus the percep-
tion of a relatively poor individual who behaves selﬁshly in the Take treatment.
Thus, selﬁsh behavior of a poor individual might lead to lower condemnation
than selﬁsh behavior of a rich individual. This argument might be strength-
ened by the fact that endowments, i.e., roles in our experiment, were allocated
randomly. Observer's might think that a dictator with 100 talers might was
very fortunate, whereas a dictator with 0 talers was very unfortunate. Being
fortunate might come with greater responsibility and thus a higher obligation
to share the talers with the recipient. In the literature on charitable giving,
for example, we ﬁnd that the acknowledgment of being fortunate is a strong
driver of individual giving (Hibbert and Home, 1996). Thus, observers who
think that dictators have been very lucky in receiving the higher endowment
might think that this goes hand in hand with an obligation to give, and vi-
olating this obligation triggers punishment more than compensating the bad
luck by being selﬁsh when having the lower endowment.
An alternative explanation for this framing eﬀect could be found in the
view that punishment is a way to choose sides (DeScioli and Kurzban, 2013)
in conﬂicts. These scholars argue that punishment is a tool for observers to
show support for one side in in disputes. This means that an observer who
punishes the dictator signals to the recipient that she is on the recipient's side.
An observer that does not punish in our paradigm could be interpreted as
choosing the side of the dictator. The diﬀerent initial endowments of dictators
and recipients in our experiment might create diﬀerent feelings of closeness
towards the other players. While in the Give treatment observers can support
the recipient with the lower endowment by punishing the dictator, in the Take
treatment some observers might choose to support the lower endowed dictator
by not punishing him.23
23Interestingly, in a rather diﬀerent setup Cubitt et al. (2011) ﬁnd that free-riding in a social
dilemma is evaluated as worse when the social-dilemma is played under a Give frame
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Although, decision problems outside the laboratory are often more complex
than those presented in the study above our work has several applications.
Think, for example, of a bureaucrat who decides on which company will receive
a public order to build a hospital. The bureaucrat's management is observed by
another colleague. An unfair action, for example given the order to a company
of the bureaucrat's wife, although it leads to the same consequences could be
perceived diﬀerently and thus lead to diﬀerent reaction of bystanders. One
can think of the bureaucrat's behavior as that he is taking something from the
common good (Take treatment), or that he fails to give the proper treatment
to a company that deserves it (Give treatment). This bystanders reaction,
however, might also depend whether the victim of the bureaucrats action will
ever be informed about his courageous act (Public treatment) or not (Private
treatment). In general it might be worthwhile for designers of organization
to consider these eﬀects when designing compliance policies or whistle-blowing
systems. They might be well advised to stress that potential wrongdoers fail to
give something to the company in order to elicit stronger reactions of whistle-
blowers.
Although framing and publicity in strategic interactions have been fairly
neglected in economic theory it might be an interesting avenue for future re-
search to enrich these models to incorporate these eﬀects. The results suggests
that bystanders or third-parties do not only care about the unfair treatment
of others but also how this unfairness emerges.
compared to a strategically equivalent social dilemma under a Take frame.
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5.5 Appendix
Tables and Figures
Table 5.4: Average received punishment and recipients expectations about pun-
ishment
Punishment of observers Expectations of recipients
Recipients payoﬀ 0
Treatment Public Private Public Private
Give 35.35 (.7) >∗∗ (††) 16.96 (.39) 24 (.65) > 19.7 (.65)
∨∗∗(†††) ∧ ∨∗(††) ∧
Take 17.48 (.3) < 18.39 (.43) 11.48 (.35) <∗ 32.45 (.55)
Recipients payoﬀ 20
Treatment Public Private Public Private
Give 16.83 (.52) >∗ 7.7 (.39) 14.48 (.57) > 8.74 (.52)
∨ ∧ ∨(†) ∧
Take 9.26 (.30) < 10.7 (.43) 10.57 (.3) < 19.36 (.45)
Recipients payoﬀ 50
Treatment Public Private Public Private
Give 3.39 (.09) > 1.7 (.09) 3.91 (.13) >∗ (†) 0 (0)
∨ ∧ ∨ ∧∗∗∗(††)
Take 1.7 (.04) <∗∗ 4.3 (.26) 3.52 (.22) < 6.41 (.27)
Notes: Average received punishment of observers and recipients expectations about punishment across treat-
ments for each recipients payoﬀ. In brackets we display the relative frequencies of observers who punish.
For recipients we show the relative frequencies who expect the observers to punish. Stars (Daggers) display
signiﬁcance levels of a Mann-Whitney U test (χ2-test). ∗∗∗(†††) p<.01,∗∗(††) p<.05, ∗(†) p<.1.
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Table 5.5: Explaining received punishment
Dependent variable:
Received punishment
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Independent variables:
Payoﬀ recipient 0 31.96∗∗∗ 15.26∗∗∗ 15.26∗∗∗ 14.09∗∗∗
(7.14) (5.82) (5.82) (4.84)
Payoﬀ recipient 20 13.43∗∗∗ 6∗∗ 6∗∗ 6.391∗∗
(4.31) (2.51) (2.51) (3.16)
1 if Take -2.064 3.120
(3.80) (3.29)
Take x payoﬀ recipient 0 -16.17∗ -1.174
(9.50) (7.57)
Take x payoﬀ recipient 20 -5.870 0.391
(5.20) (4.04)
1 if Public 0.200 -2.223
(5.13) (2.95)
Public x payoﬀ recipient 0 16.70∗ 1.696
(9.21) (7.92)
Public x payoﬀ recipient 20 7.435 1.174
(4.99) (4.30)
Constant 21.12 -18.16 15.68 -10.90
(16.90) (11.42) (16.12) (12.25)
Observations 138 138 138 138
R2 .222 .12 .218 .104
Treatments Public Private Give Take
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: GLS regression with robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered on individ-
uals). Controls variables include dummy variables for gender and whether the subject is
majoring in economics/business and a variable for subjects' age. Signiﬁcance tests are
two-sided.
∗∗∗ Signiﬁcance at p<.01, ∗∗ Signiﬁcance at p<.05, ∗ Signiﬁcance at p<.1.
This panel regression analysis further elaborates on observation 1. In models
(1) - (4) of Table 5.5 we explain the punishment levels. The models (1) and
(2) recapitulate the eﬀects of framing, and model (3) and (4) of publicity on
punishment. In every model we include dummy variables for the three potential
recipient payoﬀs, where a payoﬀ of 50 taler is the reference category. The
positive and signiﬁcant coeﬃcients of Payoﬀ recipient 0 and Payoﬀ recipient
20 reveal that punishment is higher for lower transfers to the recipient.
To uncover the eﬀects of framing on punishment for the diﬀerent payoﬀ-
levels, we include interaction terms and interact the framing dummy 1 if Take
with the diﬀerent payoﬀ levels for Public (model 1) and Private (model 2), and
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include additional control variables. In line with the non-parametric analysis
above, we observe a negative and weakly signiﬁcant coeﬃcient for the inter-
action term Take x payoﬀ recipient 0, indicating that punishment is lower
for a payoﬀ of zero in the Take treatment compared to the Give treatment.
A similar analysis for the Private treatment yields no signiﬁcant diﬀerences of
framing on punishment and thus conﬁrms the results from the non-parametric
analysis discussed above. Interestingly, in model (1) the negative and weakly
signiﬁcant (p=.093) coeﬃcient for the dummy variable 1 if female indicates
that women tend to punish less altruistically in the Public treatments. In all
other models the control variables remain insigniﬁcant.
The second set of regressions explains punishment with publicity (models 3
and 4). Again we interact the dummy 1 if Public with the diﬀerent payoﬀ
levels for Give (model 3) and Take (model 4) separately and include additional
controls. For the Give treatments we observe that punishment for the lowest
payoﬀ is higher when the recipient is informed. Although the coeﬃcients seem
to go into the predicted direction, we do not ﬁnd evidence for a similar eﬀect
of publicity on punishment in the Take treatments (model 4).
Table 5.6: Explaining recipients payoﬀ
Dependent variable:
Recipients payoﬀ
(1) (2) (3)
Independent variables:
1 if Take -0.0774 -2.165∗∗ -2.112∗∗∗
(0.63) (0.87) (0.76)
Take x Public 2.055∗∗
(0.97)
Observations 46 46 92
Pseudo−R2 .14 .16 .19
Audience Public Private pooled
Controls Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Coeﬃcients of an ordered logit regression with robust
standard errors in parentheses. Control variables include dummy
variables for gender and whether the subject is majoring in eco-
nomics/business and a variable for subjects' age. ∗∗∗ Signiﬁcance
at p<.01, ∗∗ Signiﬁcance at p<.05, ∗ Signiﬁcance at p<.1.
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Experimental instructions (translated from German)
General explanations
Thank you for your participation in the experiment. For showing up at the
experiment you receive a beneﬁt of 2,50 e. During the experiment you are able
to earn additional money. Therefore, it is important to read the instructions
carefully.
It is very important that you do not talk to others during the experiment.
In addition to that, we ask you not to use your smart phone or mobile phone.
A contravention to those rules results in an exclusion of the experiment and
all payments.
During the experiment we talk about Taler instead of Euros. Your entire
income will be primarily charged in Taler and afterward converted into Euro
and then will be paid in addition to the beneﬁt. Thereby, we use the following
conversion rate:
1 Taler = 0,1 e
You will be randomly assigned to two other group members. During the
whole experiment you will exclusively interact with those two participants.
Neither you nor they will get to know the identity of the other group members,
at no point of the session. There are three diﬀerent types of participants: A, B
and C. At the beginning of the experiment the type of participant you will be
will be randomly assigned and it will be shown on your monitor. The whole
experiment only takes one round which means that you only have to make a
decision once.
Before the participants make their decision, each one will receive an endow-
ment.
 Participant A receives an endowment of {Take:0}{Give:100} Taler.
 Participant B receives an endowment of 50 Taler.
 Participant C receives an endowment of {Take:100}{Give:0} Taler.
Decision of participant A
After every participant got to know whether he will be participant A, B or
C, participant A starts. He decides which share of {Take: C`s endowment
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he wants to deduct. He has three opportunities: He can either take 100,
80 or 50 Taler from C. The amount of Taler that he takes from C will be
deducted from C's endowment (100 Taler) and added to A's own endowment
(0 Taler).}{Give: his own endowment he wants to give to participant C. He
has three opportunities: He can either give 0, 20 or 50 Taler to participant C.
The amount of Taler that he will give to participant C will be deducted from
A´s own endowment and added to participant C´s endowment}. Afterward,
it is participant B's turn.
Decision of participant B
Participant B can decide whether he wants to deduct Taler from participant A
or not. Hereby participant B can decide whether he wants to deduct 0, 3, 6, 9,
12, 15, 18, 21, 24. . . or 99 Taler from participant A. Therefore, the deduction
of Taler is only possible in steps of 3. The costs for the deduction of 3 Taler
for participant B are 1 Taler, for 6 Taler the costs are 2 Taler and so forth.
 Example 1: If participant B wants to deduct 15 Taler from participant
A, participant B's endowment will be reduced by 5 Taler and participant
A's payoﬀ will be reduced by 15 Taler.
 Example 2: If participant B wants to deduct 48 Taler from participant A,
participant B's endowment will be reduced by 16 Taler and participant
A's payoﬀ will be reduced by 48 Taler.
Please note that it is only possible for participant B to deduct a maximum of
Taler so that participant A receives at least 0 Taler at the end of the experi-
ment. Hence, experiments´ participants cannot make any losses. Participant
B makes his decision before getting informed about participant A´s actual
decision. Thus, participant B makes a decision how many Taler he would
potentially deduct from participant A for each possible amount {Take: that
participant A could take from participant C}{Give: that participant A could
give to participant C} Participant B also makes a decision, whether he would
like to inform participant C about his decision. After participant B has made
his decisions about the Taler deduction for all of participant A´s three pos-
sible decisions, these will be compared to the actual decisions made and the
payment resulting from the one actual decision will be determined. The ta-
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Decision
Participant A
Participant C Participant A
How many
{Take: takes from} taler do you
/{Give: gives to} want to deduct
participant C receives receives from participant A?
1 100 / 0 0 100
2 80 / 20 20 80
3 50 /50 50 50
Notes: In the left part of the table you can see all of the three possible decisions participant A can make and the resulting
payoﬀs for C and A. Participant B can ﬁll in the amount of Taler he wants to deduct from participant A for each possible
decision in the right column.
ble shows all possible decisions of Participant A as well as an example of the
decision monitor of participant B:
Decision of participant C
Participant C cannot make any decisions in this experiment. {Take: He re-
ceives his endowment of 100 Taler minus the amount of Taler participant A
has taken from him.} {Give: He receives his endowment of 0 Taler plus the
amount of Taler participant A has given to him.}
Who will ﬁnd out about the participant B´s decision to deduct the
Taler?
{Public: Participant A and C will be told about the participant B´s decision to
deduct Taler from participant A. Thus, participant C will ﬁnd out how partici-
pant B has decided at the end of the experiment.}{Private: Participant A will
be told about the participant B´s decision to deduct Taler from participant
A, however, participant C will not be informed about it. Thus, participant C
will at no point of time ﬁnd out about participant B´s decision.}
How are the payments determined?
Participant A receives his endowment of {Take: 0 Taler plus the amount of
Taler that he has taken from participant C}{Give: 100 Taler minus the amount
of Taler that he has given participant C} minus the amount of Taler that were
deducted by B. Expressed in a formula: Payoﬀ participant A = {Take: 0 Taler
+}{Give: 100 Taler -} Taler of C - Taler deduction by B
Participant B receives his endowment of 50 Taler minus the amount of Taler
he had to spend in order to deduct Taler from participant A. Please note the
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costs of deducting 3 Taler are 1 Taler for participant B etc.
Expressed in a formula: Payoﬀ participant B = 50 Taler  (Taler deduc-
tion/3)
Participant C receives his endowment of {Take: 100 Taler minus the amount
of Taler participant A has deducted from him}{Give: 0 Taler plus the amount
of Taler participant A has given to him} Expressed in a formula: Payoﬀ par-
ticipant C = {Take: 100 Taler  Taler to A}{Give: 0 Taler + Taler from
A}.
Once all participants will have made their decisions, we kindly ask you to
ﬁll in a questionnaire. At the end of the experiment, the Taler converted to
Euros as described above in addition to the beneﬁt will be disbursed. Do you
have any questions? If yes, please raise your hand. We will come to your place.
If you do not have any questions, please answer the following comprehension
questions.
Control questions (translated from German)
1. Participant A {Take: takes 50 taler from}{Give: gives 50 taler to} par-
ticipant C. Participant B decides to reduce participants A's payoﬀ by 15
taler.
2. Participant A {Take: takes 100 taler from}{Give: gives 0 taler to} par-
ticipant C. Participant B decides to reduce participants A's payoﬀ by 45
taler.
3. Participant A {Take: takes 80 taler from}{Give: gives 20 taler to} par-
ticipant C. Participant B decides to reduce participants A's payoﬀ by 0
taler.
For each control question subjects have been asked to calculate the payoﬀs of
participant A, B and C after the described behavior.
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